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QUALITY ASSURANCE STUDY: 
DOCUMENTATION OF INTERHOSPITAL PATIENT TR SFER 
by Max Lebow, M.D. 
Clinical Director, Emergency 
San Bernardino County Medical 
INTRODU ION: The inappropriate transfer of 
acute and chronic health care facilities 
Departmen is one of San Bernardino Co nt 
(SBCMC) most persistent problems. With deer 
governmental support of health care, in 
for-profit hospital chains, and the incr a 
uninsured individuals, we have seen an un 
escalation in the number of interhospita 
transfers. 
San Bernardino County Medical Center recog 
of appropriate patient transfers. Trans e 
if SBCMC represents a higher level of me 
the patient qualifies for the Medically I 
Program (MIA). Appropriateness of tran f r 
by the SBCMC E~ergency Room Staff Physic an 
accepts or den es the transfer on the bas 
patien 's clinical stability, and in ace r a 
guide ines set forth by the California H 
Code (Title 22, Div. 2.5), the Joint Commi 
Accred tation of Hospitals, the Criteria 
Auto ization (Chapter 4.6), and the Inl n 
Emergency Medical Authority. Widespread 
o a r gular basis by many area hospi a 
An even more serious problem is the tra 
ho are medically unfit to be moved 
anothe • The e patients are placed at u 
becau e th y do not fit the financial req 
sendin ospital. If they have the faci i 
sho 1 withhold emergency health 
patie t's a i ity to pay. 
e primary reason this problem has er 
lack of p o er documentation. For the p 
the staff f the Department of Emergency 
c lle ted data on patient transfers that 
our Emergency Room. What follows is a 






METHODS: A prospective study of patients transferred to 
SBCMC Emergency Department was performed. The study period 
was September 1 to November 30, 1985. 
e en ered in the s udy a patient st have een 
rred directly from another hospital Emergency 
art e no npatients were included A so ex lu d 
om the study were patients transferred for psychiatric 
from Nursing Homes or Urgent Care Centers, 
transferred for admission to the SBCMC Regional 
fo matio regarding each patient was g ered sing the 
ansfer Log (see Ill. 1). The infor tio given by 
Emergency Department personnel from the transferring 
sp tal ia telephone. Data above the dark line was 
ually given and recorded by clerical and nursi g 
p onnel, while information below the line was conveyed 
physician o physician. Additional information was 
gathered once the patient arrived. 
ay into the study period, it became apparent 
f cant number of ambulatory patients were being 
wi hout communication between he transferring 
SBCMC. In these cases the f rma ion was 
by he Triage Nurse on duty using a eparate log 
. 2). This problem will be discu sed later. 
he th ee months examine , 4 3 p e s 
f r inclus on in the stu y T e patients 
d ferent hospitals, d from as far away 
wi h an average distan e travele f 31 
stribution by hospital appears i Table I. 
I 
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REASONS FOR TRANSFER 
By far, the majority of patients were trans 
financial reasons. This accounted for 91% 
into the study. Most patients fell into t 
MIA, Medi-Cal, or private pay (uninsured). 
MIA. The only appropriate transfers to SBCMC 
financial status are those patients entered 
Indigent Adult (MIA) Program. These account 
the total transfers. Such transfers are appr 
they have been sanctioned by the state, and a 
exists between SBCMC and the transferring hosp 
by Title 22 (Health and Safety Code). The 
Department Staff Physician may still deny th 
transfer if he feels the patient is medically 
One problem identified has been the transferrin 
misrepresenting the patient's financial stat s a 
order to effect his/her transfer to SBCMC. Duri 
period, 56 MIA authorization numbers were 
these patients who were later found NOT to q 
program after they arrived at our hospita . 
li ting of the hospitals most commonly give 
improperly. 
HOSP 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
p 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
HOSP 3 • . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . 6 
HOSP 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
HOSP 5 . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 
HOSP 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
tient's on California's Medi-
ass of transfers based solely on t 
status. These constituted 15% (6 
h le some Medi-Cal transfers ca e 
non-contracting hospitals, or hospitals with 
exclusions, the majority arrived from hospi 
to provide care for these patients, in clear 
Medi-Cal c ntract. Those hospitals most f 
Med -Cal patie ts appear in Table III. 
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Sixty-nine percent (296) of transferred patients 
a no orm of health insurance, public or private. Many 
ospitals transferred these patients despite the denial of their 
reques by the S staff physician on duty, in violation of 
both Title 22 and JCAH regulations. Table IV represents the 
hospitals tha most often sent patients even though permission 
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atients with no medical insurance were at the 
eing tr fe red when t y were medically 
s group accounted for 85% f u table transfers. 
Transfe s f r reasons other than 
only 9% (36) of the otal. The reason 
he transferring hospital did not provide 
patient required. I these cases, San 
un y Medical Cen er represented a higher level of 
care, and the transfer is there ore considered appropriate. 
-4-
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TRANSFER OF UNSTABLE PATIENTS 
The most serious problem of the 'hospital to has i 
issue is the transfer of medically unstable atie 
delaying treatment to effect a transfer, ho p ta 
very sick patients to unnecessary risk. Eight pe ce 
patients were determined to be unstable. One deat 
Hospitals most likely to transfer an unstable pa i 
Table V. 
TABLE V 
HOSP 1A ••••••••.•••• 6 
HOSP 2B ••••••••••••• 5 
HOSP 3C ••.•••••.•••• 4 
HOSP 4D ••••••••••••• 4 
HOSP SE ••.••.•.••••• 3 
DIAGNOSIS OF PATIENTS TRANSFERRED 
se t ese 
32) of 
Orthopedic problems accounted for nearly two of er ive 
transfers, while multisystem trauma was the di g sis of one in 
five. The remainder ran the gamut of medical and s rg cal 
illnesses. 
TELEPHONE ACCEPTANCE OF TRANSFERS 
The JCAH Accreditation Manual states that, "the pati 
not be transferred until the receiving hospital or f ci 
consented to accept the patient •.• ". This consent is u 
received by a telephone call initiated by the 
ph sician. Despite this clearly stated regula 
transfers occurred without any contact between 
receiving hospitals. This transferring doctor 
justifies this behavior by stating that he act 
the patient with a strong recommendation that 
County Medical Center without delay. This i sim 
of an ambulatory patient and attempt to bypass 
and 
of communication. An even worse abuse occurs whe 
patient is sent away without even seeing a docto 
This sick patient's only contact with the sendi 
be the financial office. The only documentat o 
bring with them is a note asking that they go 
ital rna 
patients 
as possible. One hospital has gone so far as to 





The 123 non-called transfers is actually artificial y 1 
because we had no mechanism for identifying thes ses he 
beginning of the study. During the first seve week , only 13 
cases were discovered, while 110 cases were see e final 
-5-
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five weeks after a system for catching these cases was 
instituted. When extrapolated to cover the entire twelve week 
period of study, an astonishing 46% of all transfers were found 
to have not been called in. Table VI shows the most frequent 
abusers and Chart II shows a comparison of called to non-called 
transfers. 
TABLE VI 
HOSP I .............. 23 
HOSP I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
HOSP II I ............ 8 
HOSP IV ............. 8 
HOSP v .............. 7 
HOSP VI ............. 6 
HOSP VII ...... ...... 6 
HOSP VIII ........ ... 5 
HOSP I X ••••••••••••• 5 
HOSP X •••••••••••••• 5 
FINANCIAL IMPACT: The fifteen hospitals listed below accounted 
for 94% of all admitted transfers. Of the 260 admissions, 
165 (63%) were coded as 'D', SBCMC's designation of private 
pay, on admission to the hospital. Financial Services was able 
to find third party reimbursements (usually governmental), for 
55%, while the remaining 45% (74) patients remained as 'D's. 
-6-







Disc a ge 
=============== ========== ====== === ========== 
TOTAL TRANSFERS 260 65 74 
HOSP A 23 14 5 
HOSP B 8 5 3 
HOSP C 13 11 7 
HOSP D 10 3 2 
HOSP E 19 14 1 
HOSP F 7 4 1 
HOSP G 13 7 5 
HOSP H 21 1 8 
HOS I 6 5 l --- -- -1-- -- ----
0 I 6 HOSP J 15 
HOSP K 8 
HOSP 8 
OSP M 30 5 
HO N 6 5 
s 
A good dea of spec lation comes into 
financial m a t of hese private pay 
While keepin this in mind, some general 
at by using kno n hospital averages. 
es imating the 
ssio s on SBCMC. 
fi res may be arrived 
-7-
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The average hospital stay at SBCMC is billed at about 
$4,300.00. The present rate of 74 private pay admissions per 
quarter would equal 296 patients per year. This gives a total 
billing of approximately $1.3 million. With a collection rate 
of 20% on private pays, this gives a total loss of one million 
dollars per year due to inappropriate transfers. This does not 
include an estimated loss of over $50,000.00 per year thxough 
the ER of non-admitted patients (assumes average ER billing of 
$110.00). 
Other costs include 29,000 ambulance miles for transfers 
yearly. There are also hidden expenses, such as the added 
hospital days caused by delays in treatment during the transfer 
process, or the extra miles traveled by families to visit their 
loved ones in an out-of-town hospital. 
CONCLUSION: The health care industry has an obligation to deliver 
the highest quality health care with as much economic 
responsibility as possible. One way to accomplish this is to 
set hospital policy and lobby regulatory agencies to help 
minimize the transfer of patients solely on their ability to 
pay. 
-8-
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SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER 
HOSPITAL TRANSFER POLICY AND PROTOCOL 
While each transfer request must be considered on an individual patient 
by patient basis, the will apply to all 
transfers from other and emergency room transfers: 
1. The princi is that patients should be transferred only for 
medical reasons in that the County Medical Center represents a higher level 
of care offered than that of the sending institution. 
2. Transfers for economic reasons only will not be accepted. 
3. County Medical Center will accept those 
liable (MIA 1 s) from contract 
ients for whom they are 
hospitals. 
4. All who are being transferred must meet the criteria for 
stability for transfer. 
5. All transfers must be made on a ician to physician basis and must 
be accepted the receiv ician at the Medical Center. 
6. All 
accompany 
documentat test results and x-rays must 
transferred. 
7. The patient or his or her guardian must agree to the transfer if they 




Medical Center must be able to 
which includes theavailabil 
's 
the services required 
of beds, equipment, and personnel 
enumerated above and the availability of facilities 
considered a list of the types 
agree to 
1. Burn ients 
2. Patients requi treatment under the California Involuntary Civil 
Commitment Code (5150 1 s) 
3. requir the services of the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit 
4. Indi Adults (MIA's from hospitals. These 
patients must meet all of the criteria as to res , income, etc. contained 
in the contractural 
-9-
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5. Services required by the patients are not available at the sending hospital. 
Services not available at the sending hospital are defined as services which 
are not listed on the hospital's inventory of services as filed with the 
Office of State Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). 
6. The transferring hospital's beds are full. 
7. The patient being transferred mee~ the guidelines for stability as outlined 
in this policy. 
UNACCEPTABLE TRANSFERS 
The following categories of patients will not be accepted for treatment at 
the County Medical Center: 
1. All patients who do not meet a category listed above in the acceptable 
transfer section. 
2. All patients who have not been accepted by the Medical Center. This 
includes patients who do meet the normal criteria for acceptance but for 
whom the sending institution has not contacted a physician and received approval 
at the Medical Center. 
3. Patients will be refused when no beds. staff, or facilities are available 
for the services required by the patient who otherwise meets the acceptable 
criteria. 
4. Patients who do not meet the criteria for stability contained in this 
policy. 
DEFINITION OF STABILITY FOR TRANSFER: 
Before a patient may be transferred to San Bernardino Medical Center, 
the sending hospital must provide such evaluation as required the patient's 
condition to determine that the patient is medically stable for transfer. 
Both the California Administrative Code (Title 22, Sec. 51110) and the Manual 
of Criteria for Medi-Cal Authorization (Ch. 4.6) define "Medically stable for 
transfer" as the condition of an acute care patient which allows the patient 
to reasonably sustain a transport in an EHT-I staffed ambulance with no 
expected increase in morbidity or mortality. (An EMT-I may not transport 
a patient who requires intravenous medication or an intravenous line to which 
medication has been added. They may only monitor and turn off the flow of 
intravenous fluids.) While most intrahospital patient transfers to San Bernardino 
County Medical Center are by higher level of ambulance personnel, San Bernardino 
County Medical Center will only accept patients who are able to be transported 
by EMT-I safely. These patients must have a stable blood pressure and pulse 




The following list of conditions shall be used as a guideline for 
determining stability of a patient for transfer. This list is 
not meant to be all-inclusive, and patients with conditions not 
listed may be unstable under certain circumstances. 
- Patients whose vital signs or stability are immediately 
dependent upon intravenous drug therapy 
Intubated patients who require ventilatory support 
- Patients with unstable cardiac rhythms 
- Shock of any cause 
- Acute respiratory insufficiency 
- Severe metabolic abnormalities 
-Myocardial infarction, R/0 Myocardial infarction, Unstable 
angina 
- Hypertensive Crisis or symptomatic hypertension 
Life threatening infections 
Active labor with imminent delivery 
Fetal Distress 
Ruptured Ectopic Pregnancy 
Active third trimester bleeding 
Status Epilepticus 
Central focal neurologic deficits caused by trauma 
Unstable spinal fractures 
Penetrating chest trauma 
Penetrating abdominal trauma 
Cardiac Contusion 
Flail Chest 
- Acute ischemic limb 
- Patients who are less than 24 hours post-surgery 
San Bernardino County Medical Center recognizes that there are 
times when stabilization is not possible because a hospital does 
not ha e the appropriate personnel or equipment needed to correct 
the underlying disease process. In these cases an adequate 
airway, control of hemorrhage, and initiation of fluid and/or 
blood replacement should be performed, and the transfer should be 
carried out as quickly as possible to the closest facility able 
to deliver the appropriate care. 
-11-
PROTOCOL FOR TRANSFERRING PATIENTS 
The 







1. been determined that 
this policy and is 
meets the criteria 




must be made by a physician, and 
in the San Bernardino 
3. records and documents must accompany the 
transfer has been approved. 
1. been determined that the 
Medical Center and 
the is well enough to be transferred, 
transfer will be 
Center Emergency 
when the 










hours of 8 a.m. and 12 noon. This is the 
Center. 
explain to the 
the operator which service 
, surgery, etc. 
with the appropriate at 
should be completed 
Medical Center 






Report: MAX LEBOW, M.D. 
DATE FINANCIAL REASON T'FER CODE 



























































































T: STAB, AB 
T: STAB; CHEST, ABDO 
T: STAB EST 
T: STAB CHEST (PNEUMO) 
T: COMA, TRAUMA, ETOH 
T: BLUNT ABDO TRAUMA 
T: STAB; HEST 




O.D., HYP ENIVE 
T: FX PELVIS (MCA) 
T: GSW ABDO 
CROUP 
PNEUNOTHORAX 
T: GSW NECK 
HEPATIC FAILURE, HYPOKA 
T: GSW EST 
DH, CRF, DEHYDRATED 
T: FX C-SPINE, RIBS 
0: FX TIB-FIB; PULSELES 
0: FX FOOT; ISCHEMIC 
ECTOPIC 
UNSTABLE ANGINA 
T: STAB HEST 
T: STAB A DO 
CHF, S VERE 
T: STA AB 
T: SU YESEMA, UNS 
T: CHES AUMA 








November 18, 1986 
Max Lebow, M.D.,Clinical Director 
Emergency Services 
San Bernardino County Medical Center 
Lucien Wulsin, Jr., Principle Consultant 
Joint Committee on Medi-Cal Oversight 
PHONE 
SUBJECT Medi-Cal Transfers 
2·1367·000 Rev. 9/85 
Enclosed please find a list of Medi-Cal transfers to San Bernardino 
County Medical Center Emergency Department for 6 months between 
September 1, 1985 and March 31, 1986 (December omitted). 
Total number Medi-Cal Transfers for 6 months-113 
These transfers occurred primarily from Medi-Cal contracting hospitals 
in San Bernardino County. 
this information will be of use to you. 
-14-

File: M.CAL TRANSFER Page 
Report: MAX LEBOW, M.D. 
DATE FINANCIAL REASON T'FER UNSTABLE ER CALLED ADMIT CODE DX ....: _______ 
-----~---- ------------- --------- ---------- ------ ----- ------------Sep 1 M-CAL $ A RASH 
Sep 6 M-CAL $ N A CHILD ABUSE 
Sep 6 M-CAL $ N y A 0: TENDON LAI 
Sep 10 M-CAL $ y A MULT. O.D. 
Sep 14 H-CAL $ y A 0: FX TIB-FIJ 
Sep 14 H-CAL $ A 0: LAC HAND 
Sep 17 M-CAL $ ··- y A T: STAB; CHE~ ,,. 
Sep 18 H-CAL $ A 0: LAC WRIST, 
Sep 21 M-CAL $ A 0: FX RADIUS 
Sep 23 M-CAL $ A 0: TENDON REI 
Sep 24 M-CAL $ N A 0: D/L ELBOW 
Sep 25 M-CAL $ y A 0. D. : UNK. ME 
Sep 26 M-CAL $ A 0: FX RADIUS 
Sep 29 H-CAL $ y A HERNIA, INCAF 
Oct 2 M-CAL $ LWBS A 0: SEPTIC JOI 
Oct 2 M-CAL $ A SEIZURE 
Oct 6 M-CAL $ A 0: LAC HAND 
Oct 6 H-CAL NO PEDS OR THO y A 0: TENDON LAC 
0 t 8 M-CAL $ y A 0: TENDON LAC 
Oct 13 M-CAL $ A URI 
Oct 22 H-CAL $ N A HEADACHE 
Oct 22 H-CAL $ ;'{ y A T: GStv CHEST 
Oct 23 H-CAL $ N A HBP, SYNCOPE 
Oct 24 M-CAL $ A 0: ANKLE INJU 
Oct 2 M-CAL $ N y A 0: TENDON LAC 
Oct 7 H-CAL $ y A 0: FX HAND (0 
0 t 28 ~1-CAL $ N A 0: FX CLAVICA 
Oct 28 M-CAL $ N A 0: FX FIBULA 
Oct 3 M-CAL $ N A 0: FX ANKLE 
N v 2 M-CAL ? N y A VAG BLEED 
Nov 3 t1-CAL ? INADEQUATE y A T: MULT TRAUM 
ov 4 M-CAL $ A 0: FX PATELLA 
OV 4 M-CAL ? N A T: FX L-5 
Nov 4 M-CAL ? N y A T: FX PELVIS 
No M-CAL $ N A 0: LIG INJURY 
I Nov 8 M-CAL $ N A 0: BACK INJUR 
Nov 8 M-CAL $ N A 0: FX WRIST 
No 9 M-CAL y A FB ESOPHAGUS 
No 13 M-CAL $ N LWBS A HEMOPTYSIS 
Nov 13 H-CAL $ N A 0: FX RADIUS 
Nov 15 M-CAL $ N A 0: ANKLE CONT 
OV 15 M-CAL $ y A 0: FX ELBOW 
Nov 15 M-CAL ? N A 0: R/0 FX LEG 
Nov 16 M-CAL $ N A FB VAGINA 
Nov 16 M-CAL $ A T: HI NOR HEAD 
-15-
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Report: X LEBOW, M.D. 
E FINANCIAL REASON T'FER UNSTABLE ER CALL AD~1 ODE DX 
-------- - -~----- ------------- -------- ----- - ------
Nov 1 M-CAL $ N 0: FX HAND 
Nov 20 M-CAL $ EN ETRI s 
Nov 20 M-CAL $ N 0: FX HAND 
Nov 21 M-CAL $ N A 0: FX RADIUS 
Nov 21 M-CAL $ N 0: FX RADIU 
OV 22 -CAL $ A 0: FX FINGE 
No 24 M-CAL $ N A 0: FX 
Nov 25 M-CAL $ N A CIRRHOSIS 
Nov 2 M-CAL $ N 0: FX RIST 
Nov 28 M-CAL $ 0: FX ACETABl 
N v 28 M-CAL $ N A 0: FX TIBIA ~ 
N v 30 H-CAL $ y A PYLORIC, STE~ 
Nov 30 H-CAL $ N A 0: FX FEHUR 
Jan 2 M-CAL $ N ERYSEPALAS 
Jan 2 M-CAL $ N A 0: FX TIBIA 
3 M-CAL $ A 0: BOXER'S f) 
3 M-CAL $ N 0: FX ELBmv 
4 AL $ FACIA CEL 
4 L BURN y A BURN 
9 Jvl- AL $ OB/GYN: HR 
10 AL $ A 0: FX L 
1 MIA A EPIGASTRIC PJ 
1 $ N 0: FX RAD us 1 
$ N A AR A 
N 0: IN AN 
$ N 0: FX A M 
$ N R/0 JvlENN 
0: FX m1 
$ R/0 A p 
A T: KU 
N 0: LAC N 
$ A 0: SEPTIC H 
A IN RN A 
$ N DIARRH 
A OB/GYN: PO r 
$ N 0: FX N 
$ N CELLUL IS 
$ N 
A 0: HUHE AL F; 
FACE CONTUS I ( 
12 $ ? 
12 $ A 0: FX WR s 
15 IA A 0: FX HIP 
M- A NVERSI R: 
15 $ ? T: HULT TRAU! 
-16-
File: M.CAL TRANSFER Pag 
Report: MAX LEBOW, M.D. 
E FINANCIAL REASON T'FER UNSTABLE ER CALLED ADMIT CODE DX 
----- - --------- ------------- --------- ---------- ------
Feb 17 M-CAL NO NOUROSURG y A T: NC s 
Feb 19 CAL $ A 0 SHOU ER 
Feb 20 M-CAL $ N A GASTROENTER ' 
Feb 21 M-CAL .$ y A 0: OPEN FIN 
Feb 24 M-CAL $ N A 0: BOXER'S 
Feb 24 M-CAL $ N A 0: FX FIBULA 
Mar 2 M-CAL $ N y A ABDO PAIN 
Mar 2 M-CAL $ N A GOUT 
Mar 5 M CAL $ N A LAC TONGUE 
Mar 4 M-CAL $ y A T: MULT T m 
Mar 17 M-CAL $ N y A 0: FX E 
0 Mar 1 7 M-CAL $ N A 0: FX \~RI S 
J'v!ar 20 M-CAL $ N A 0: FX THUMB 
Mar 20 M-CAL $ N ( ? ) A 0: TENDON ( 
Mar 22 M-CAL $ A 0: FX ARM 
Mar 25 M CAL $ A 0: BILAT w 
Mar ') M-CAL ? N y A T: L. 
r 26 M-CA $ N A T: 
Mar 2 M-CAL $ y A 0: 
Mar 2 M-CAL ? y A 0: 
Ma 29 M-CAL $ y A 0: 
Mar 0 M CAL $ A 0: ELB 





TESTIMONY ON PATIENT TRANSFER lEGISLATION 
BY THOMAS l. HOROWITZ. D.O. 
ASSEMBLY MEDI-CAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE 
NOVEMBER 19, 1986 
MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS, I AM TOM HOROWITZ REPRESENTING BOTH THE CALIFORNIA 
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION AND THE lOS ANGELES COUNTY MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AND I 
APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY ON THE SUBJECT OF PATIENT TRANSFERS. 
FIRST, I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT BOTH CMA AND LACMA ARE IN STRONG SUPPORT OF 
REDUCING THE POTENTIAL FOR ANY ILLEGAL OR INAPPROPRIATE HOSPITAL TRANSFERS 
OF PATIENTS TO TAKE PLACE IN THE FUTURE. WE FULLY SUPPORTED THAT INTENT IN 
LEGISLATION INTRODUCED LAST YEAR AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. TO THIS END, 
WE ALSO CONTINUE TO SEEK EQUAL ACCESS TO QUALITY HEALTH CARE SERVICES FOR 
ALL CALIFORNIANS. AS THIS POLICY APPLIES TO PATIENT TRAt!SFERS, WE BELIEVE 
IT CAN BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY INCREASING THE PROTECTIONS AGAINST ILLEGAL 
AND IMPROPER TRANSFERS OF EMERGENCY PATIENTS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME 
R SOME OF THE MAJOR ECONOMIC FACTORS CONTRiBUTING TO THE CAUSES OF 
DUMP " 
AS WE SEE IT, THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF PATIENT DUMPING IS THE FACT THAT 
Fl ENT MONEY IS BEING SET ASIDE BY SOME COUNTIES FOR THE CARE OF 
MEDICALLY INDIGENT PEOPLE WHEN THEY BECOME ILL OR INJURED, AND THIRD PARTY 
PAYORS ARE NOT ALWAYS OWNING UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR OTHER 
EMERGENCY PATIENTS. FOR THIS REASON CMA SUPPORTED PATIENT TRANSFER 
lEGISLATION CH WAS EMBODIED IN SB 1607, AUTHORED BY SENATOR MADDY. 
SB 1607, FACE THE REAL PROBLEM SQUARELY. ORIGINALLY, IT MANDATED THAT ALL 
PARTIES INVOLVED IN FUNDING HEALTH CARE LIVE UP TO THE R RESPONSIBILITIES --
WHETHER THEY ARE INSURERS, HMO'S, COUNTIES OR OTHERS. IT WAS A RESPONSIBLE 
APPROACH TO THE PATIENT TRANSFER PROBLEM. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS APPROACH. AS 
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IT APPLIES TO COUNTIES, HAD TO BE MODIFIED BECAUSE WE REALIZE THAT WHEN THE 
STATE TRANSFERRED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CARE OF MEDICALLY INDIGENT ADULTS 
TO THE COUNTIES IN 1982, IT GRANTED COUNTIES LESS THAN 70 PERCENT OF THE 
PREVIOUS FUNDING. THAT BECAME AN ALMOST IRONCLAD GUARANTEE OF TROUBLE --
AND TROUBLE HAS COME. 
IN ITS FINAL FORM SB 1607 CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS: 
1) IT WOULD HAVE ESTABLISHED CLEAR GUIDELINES FOR APPROPRIATE TRANSFERS 
OF PATIENTS WHO ARE ADMITTED TO HOSPITALS IN EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, 
BOTH B~FORE AND AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN STABILIZED. 
2) IT WOULD HAVE ESTABLISHED THE REQUIREI.IENT FOR THIRD PARTIES WHICH 
ARE ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING EMERGENCY SERVICES TO 
PAT I EtHS TO PAY FOR SUCH SERVICES WHEN THEY ARE RESPONS ISLE. 
3) ALTHOUGH THE BILL WOULD NOT HAVE ESTABLISHED A MANDATE FOR PAYMENT 
FROM COUt.JT I ES FOR EMERGENCY SERVICES REt!DERED TO COUtJTY INDIGENTS, 
IT WOULD HAVE ESTABLISHED A "MAINTENANCE OF EFFORT REQUIREMENT FOR 
THOSE COUNTIES WHICH CURRENTLY PAY FOR THESE SERVICES AND 
ENCOURAGED THOSE COUNTIES THAT DON'T PAY NOW TO BEGIN PAYING AS SOON 
AS POSSIBLE. 
LAST YEAR ASSEMBLYMAN MARGOLIN AUTHORED AB 3403, AN ANTI-DUMPING MEASURE 
WHICH WAS OPPOSED BY CMA FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 
1) THE AS SOC IAT I ON BEL I EYED THAT AB 3403 WOULD MOST Ll KEL Y RESULT IN A 
WORSE SITUATION THAN THAT WHICH CURRENTLY EXISTS. HOSPiTALS WOULD 




N EMERGENCY CONDITIONS; PHYSICIANS WOULD REMOVE THEIR NAMES FROM 
ON-CALL LISTS; AND MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, MANY MORE COUNT ES WOULD JOIN 
THOSE FEW WH CH DO NOT CURRENTLY 
TO COUNTY INDIGENTS. THE NET RESULT BE NG 
iCES RENDERED 
FORNIANS 
WOULD HAVE RESTRICTED ACCESS TO NECESSARY EMERGENCY HEALTH CARE 
SERVICES. 
2) AB 3403 DID NOT ADDRESS THE PRIMARY IC ILLEGAL OR 
INAPPROPRIATE PATIENT DUMPING. IT WOULD Sl HAVE EXPANDED THE 
BASIS FOR DETERMINING VIOLATIONS WHILE INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR 
SUCH VIOLATIONS AND THEIR APPLICATION. FURTHERMORE THE PROTOC0LS 
AND TRANSFER CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY THIS B E RESTRICTIVE 
AND MIGHT HAVE PROHIBITED SAFE TRANSFER 
PATIENTS, OR EVEN PROHIBITED TRANSFERS OF SOME 
ZED EMERGENCY 
ALTOGETHER. 
OVERALL, WED NOT SEE HOW THE APPROACH 
PROBLEM OF PAT ENT DUMPING. 
N COUL CURE THE 
CMA HAS RECENTLY ADOPTED POLICY TO SPONSOR LEG 







YOU ADDRESSING -- AND WE HOPE SOLV 
THE CAUSES OF ILLEGAL PAT ENT 
MY TTEN TESTIMONY, HOWEVE 1 
RESPONS I B I ITY TO IR SPEC! 
DEAL WITH TH S PROBLEM IN LOS ANGELE 
GIVE YOU BR F UPDATE ON OUR ACTIVITIES 
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California Hospital Association 
1023 12th Street P.O. Box 1100 Sacramento, CA 95805-1100 916/443-7401 
Testimony of the 
California Association of Hospitals and Health Systems 
Before the 
Assembly Special Committee on Medi-Cal Oversight 
Regarding Legislation on Inappropriate Patient Transfers 
November 19, 1986 
Chairman Margolin and Members, my name is Douglas J. Hitchcock. I am 
Vice President and Counsel for Government Relations for the California 
Association of Hospitals and Health Systems (CAHHS), formerly the 
California Hospital Association. 
CAHHS is pleased to testify in support of appropriate and carefully 
considered legislation addressing clinically inappropriate patient 
transfers. 
Our association represents almost 500 private community, public, and 
u versity hospitals in California. A growing number of those 
hospitals are affiliated with, or in a contractual relationship with, 
health maintenance organizations and other providers of health 
coverage which limit the choice of providers of services in exchange 
for lower rates. Two hundred and seventy-one of those hospitals hold 
contracts with the state of California to provide inpatient Medi-Cal 
ser ices. 
At e outset, I would like to distinguish the problem of medically 
ina riate patient transfers, upon which this committee is focusing 
today, from the phenomenon of patient transfers for economic reasons. 
CAHHS and its member institutions hold the life and health of patients 
highest regard. We would never condone the clinically 
riate transfer of a patient in circumstances which would 
anger e patient's life or chance for a full recovery. We would 
c earl distinguish, however, such medical inappropriate transfers, 
ted state and federal law, from clinically appropriate 
rs for economic reasons. 
Health funding and coverage mechanisms adopted both by the state of 
California and by private entities oviding health coverage 
necess tate economic transfers. In those areas of the state in which 
California Medical Assistance Commission has negotiated inpatient 
contracts, noncontract hospitals are authorized to provide only 
emergency services to Medi-Cal patients and are required to transfer 
e patient to contract hospitals after stabilization and as soon as 
the transfer can be made without endangering the patient. Most health 
maintenance organizations and other similar organizations generally 
-21-
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staff supporters of the legislation, and CAHHS 
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tals agr had to be addres to 
would achieve its desired objective 
counterproductive side effects. 
ortant attributes of legislation whi 
i lly inappr riate transfers without 
rdens side effects include: 
ec ition of the distinct o 
reas ns a r riate transfers for econom 
r nsfers wh ch inappropriately endanger ti 
that legislation should not attempt to regulate, 
t s made for bona fide medical reas ns 
reg 
in 
owledge the appr riateness, unde 
transfers for economic reasons, 
ith those transfers consistent 
vely addressing medically i 
tients. 
should prov de c 
into account 





legislation should avoid 
affect the availability or 
cessively iti 
providing special 
rtments and, if rna 
are valu e communi 
discontinue 
administeri 






























































TESTIMONY OF LOUIS D. LEARY (OSHPD) 
BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON 
MEDI-CAL OVERSIGHT 
NOVEMBER 19, 1986 
Good morning, Chairman Margolin and fellow Committee members. My name is 
Louis D. Leary and I am the Chief of the Health Planning Section in the Office 
of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). We have been asked by 
your Committee's staff to address a variety of issues related to the topic of 
"Patient Dumping of the Medically Indigent." 
The information we will use to address your concerns comes from two sources: 
the OSHPD SB 2062 Report on Competition and more recent California hospital 
utilization and financial data gathered and published by OSHPD. 
In discussing the issue of "patient dumping 11 , it fs important to acknowledge 
that there are problems in defining such practices, and empirically validating 
the extent to which they occur. County hospitals (or hospitals that have 
contractural arrangements to assist counties in providing health care to 
medically indigent populations) typically receive three kinds of patient 
transfers: 
1. Patients may be transferred from one hospital to a county hospital 
because the only hospital offering necessary specialized services in a 
community may be the county hospital. 
2. Hospitals may transfer a patient whose care is clearly, or arguably, 
the fiscal responsibility of the county, but only after the patient•s 
medical condition has been appropriately stabilized. 
3. Hospitals may also transfer a patient whose care is the fiscal 
responsibility of the county before the patient's medical condition has 
been appropriately stabilized. 
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11 Patient dumping .. , certai y a 
describe this third type 
may be a lack of clint consensus 
11 stabiltzed", thus 
practice. 
Finally, other practices ___ i f a 
hospital may be consi 
may seek non-emergency care 
forcing the patient to , or in some cases 
the patient to the county 
is problematic because 
unsuccessful attempt to 
no formal record of 
OSHPD does not systemati 
clini~ally inappropriate 
11 appropriate 11 transfers 
planning agencies in 1 
identify problems with 1 
refer to as "dumping 11 , 
of this systematicall 
However, your staff 
often associated with i 
trends in three financi 
relevance to this issue 
1. Trends in hospi 
2. Trends in 
3. Trends in 






e or no 













Figure 1 shows that as competi on and deregul on emented in 
California, hospital net profits have more than doubled in five years. 
However, a note of caution is in order. 
terms of percentage profit (s us) 
data show large differences among ownership 
the same data in 
p category. These 
es. Non-profit hospitals 
have the highest average net profit; county hospitals show a sizeable deficit. 
The trend of capital expenditures is also important to examine since high net 
profits can be produced by minimizing these expenditures. Figure 3 shows that 
non-profit, investor-owned and distri hospitals have ~ nimized these 
expenditures; they have all increased their quarterly capital expenditures per 
bed. In contrast, county hospital quarterly capi expenditures are 
significantly lower. 
If county hospitals had expended capital at a similar that spent by 
all other California hospitals, the level of county hospital capital 
expenditures, 1980-1985, would have been $660 million. This $660 million is 
based on the average expenditures per bed of all other ownership categories 
and then estimated for county hospitals based on the existing county 
hospital beds. It is the amount county s should have reserved and 
used for capital expenditures but were unable to indigent care, and 
Medi-Cal and other contractual adjustments. To p make up for the "short 
fall" associated with a high proportion of 
undercompensated care, it appears that county 
care 
s had essentially 
neglect necessary investment in capital expenditures such as remodeling and 
replacement of plant. 
Figure 4 displays a comparison of the total ons gross revenue 
among hospital ownership groups. Deductions from revenue i ude contractura 1 
adjustments and disallowances. Provision bad debts charity allowances 
are also a large part of deductions from revenue. The deductions for county 
hospitals are nearly twice as high as the 3 tal groups. The annual 
rate of these deductions, based on the 1 , is 5 bi 11i on 
dollars. It should be pointed out that in 1 , year in which 
California's competition initiatives were first t, tal 
deductions from gross revenue continued their hi c increase, but all other 
hospitals began experiencing a reduction in on from revenue. This data 
indicates that the burden of care was i y borne by 
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public hospitals -- presumably because of the gradual substitution of 
prospective payment for cost-based reimbursement which reduced private 
hospitals • ability to 11Cost-sh1ft 11 and subsidize undercompensated and 
uncompensated care. 
However, 1984 and 1985 data show deductions from revenue again increasing for 
all hospital categories. County hospitals still bear the burden of a 
disproportionate share of deductions from revenue, including uncompensated 
care, but it is again a growing problem for all hospital ownership categories. 
A closer look at the county hospitals (Figure 5) shows a continuing large 
11Short fa11 11 between total operating expenses and revenue. This 11 Short fall", 
however, is reduced by the annual state and county appropriations displayed in 
Figure 6. 
1986 data have been selected to illustrate county hospitals' current 
disproportionate share of uncompensated services. gure 7 shows data on bad 
debts and charity allowances per discharge, by ownership category. County 
hospitals provide a bad debts/charity dollars per discharge rate seven times 
that of the other 3 hospital groups. Anecdotally, counties indicate that one 
of the reasons contributing to the financial status of county hospitals is 
that they provide an increasing disproportionate share of Medi-Cal services as 
well as nearly all the Medically Indigent Adult (MIA) services. Figure 8 
shows a comparison of the Medi-Cal admissions as a percent of total 
admissions. 37 percent of the city-county hospital patients in the first 
quarter of 1986 were Medi-Cal enrollees» as compared to 11 to 13 percent for 
the other ownership categories. Between fiscal years 1980-81 and 1984-85, 
Medi-Cal admissions in city/county hospitals have increased 1 percent. In 
contrast, between fiscal years 1980-81 and 1984-85, Medi-Cal admissions in 
private nonprofit, district, and investor-owned hospitals consistently 
decreased between 1.5 and 3.0 percent. Also, during this time frame, a large 
number of Medi-Cal eligibles were transfered to county responsibility through 
the MIA transfer. 
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Fiscal comparative data from the 1st and 
for the four ownership categories. 
from revenue are increasing for 1 
percent overall; 13 percent for ci 
comparison may be somewhat misleading since 
for city-county hospitals are much higher than the 
ownership categories, (40 percent compared 
County hospital profits {surpluses} are non-exi 




ons from revenue 
the other 3 
r capital 
expenditures are negligible. County hospitals a burden of 
uncompensated and undercompensated care. (Although, as we previously 
mentioned, the gap between county hospitals and 1 other ownership categories 
has narrowed since 1984.) 
The trend away from cost-based reimbursement in 
may reduce the ability of private hospitals to 
uncompensated care while continuing to make a 
private hospitals to transfer indi pati 
it is impossible to empirically link 
As I mentioned earlier, OSHPD at this time does not 
data that sufficiently discriminates i 
admission problems from other y 
tal sector 
and thus subsidize 
is may encourage 
1i es, although 
dumping 11 • 
ca 11,y co 11 ect 
transfer or 
admissions. However, in developing the in 1985, 
we contracted with all existing Health 
health leaders in their respective areas 
indigent access to care. 
The problem most often cited was the 
provider related to Medi-Cal selective 
of MIA care responsibility to counties. 
indigents inconvenienced by the 1 
hospital or clinic care. Also, a 
of primary and specialty care physician 
may be increasing due to contracti 
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ly~ many HSAs 
identified a general state of provider and beneficiary confusion which may 
have inhibited access during the early implementation of Medi-Cal contracting 
and the MIA transfer in 1983. 
In reviewing the individual HSA reports, some anecdotal data on perceived 
inappropriate transfering and "dumping" were presented. But, by-in-large, 
HSAs either indicated that transfers were being appropriately conducted or 
that clear cut evidence of inappropriate transfers was lacking. 
One problem noted in surveys by both the Central California Health Systems 
Agency (including Fresno, Tulare and Kern counties) and the Inland Counties 
Health Systems Agency (including San Bernardino and Riverside counties) was 
the lack of sufficient intercounty coordination and financing of patient 
transfers. For instance, Tulare County representatives indicated that they 
were of the opinion that other counties were not providing reimbursement for 
necessary services they provided to out-of-county MIA patients, consequently, 
Tulare County has not been enthusiastic about reimbursing other counties for 
reciprocal services. The Central California report indicates that area 
legislators have been approached and asked by county and hospital 
representatives to amelionate this situation for the benefit of patients. 
The Central California Health HSA report concluded wi recommendations that 
mechanisms be developed to ease transfers and between counties 
for low pay and no pay patients. 
This concludes my presentation. I am available for any follow up questions. 
-29-
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FIGURE 1 
CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL NET PROFIT IN BILLIONS 
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FIGURE 9 
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ASSEMBLYMAN MARGOLIN HE~qiNG ON PATIENT 
DU~ING OF THE MEDICALLY INDIGENT 
In Los Angeles ~dnesday, November 19, 1985 
Presented by Paul~. Keller. Chief, Field Operations Branch 
Licensing and Certificati.t'fn, Department of Health Services 
~r. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name 
is Paul Keller. I am Chief, Field Operations Branch of Licensing and 
Certification, Department of Health Services. 
~Y testimony answers the questions forwarded last week by members of your staff 
to the Department. It is as follows: 
1. Whether patient dumping in hospital emergency rooms is occurring, what is 
its incidence, and what has been ita increase since the 19S2 reforms? 
As you may know, most general acute care hospitals are surveyed every three 
years or more often if necessary, by the Department of Health Services, 
Joint Com~ission on Accreditation of Hospitals and the California Medical 
Association. In the interim, De~artment personnel investigate alleged 
complaints registered through our district offices. It is through the 
complaint investigation process that the Department becomes aware of 
inappropriate patient transfers. 
- 1 -
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Approximately 7,100,000 patients were treated in acute hospitals emergency 
rooms in the past year. Since early 1985, Licensing and Certification has 
investigated approximately 20 cases of alleged patient or these, 
40% were substantiated. From this perspective, patient dumping is not a 
com~~~ practice, but does occur. 
It is difficult to ascertain whether there has been an increase in "patient 
dumping" since the 1932 reform. It has only been in the last year that 
these incidents have come to the attention of Licensing and Certification. 
2. Whether the dumping of p~tients violates existing laws administered the 
Department, and what are the Department's views on the efficacy of the 
remedies or sanctions available to the Department's licensing division? 
Current law, Health and Safety Code Section 1317, requires a hospital with 
an emergency department to provide such services to any person requesting 
such services, for any condition in which the person is in danger of loss of 
life, or serious injury or illness. These services must be provided when 
such health facility has appropriate facilities and qualified personnel 
available to provide such services or care without first questioning the 
patient, or any other person, as to ability to pay. Additionally, acute 
prior to a transfer, that the transfer will not cause a medical hazard to 
the patient and that the transferring faci makes advance 




Our investigations of complaints relating to inappropriate patient transfer 
have revealed violations of the law and licensing regulations. 
Current sanctions available to the Department to deal with the problems of 
inappropriate patient transfers consist of the following in order of 
severity: 
1. Statement of Deficiencies which requires the facility to develop a plan 
for corrective action within a specified time frame. 
2. Withdrawal of the Departmental approval for the facility to provide 
emergency medical services. 
3. A recommendation for decertification from the ~edicare or Medi-Cal 
program to the Department of Health and Human Services, Health Care 
Financing Administration. A recently enacted Federal Law (C.O.B.R.A.) 
imposes mo~etary penalties on hospitals and physicians for inappropriate 
patient transfers. 
4. Revocation of the facility's hospital license. 
These sanctions represent the extremes in enforcement; from minor 
inconvenience (Statement of Deficiencies) to the threat of facility closure 
{license revocation). Currently, there are no intermeiiate sanctions 
available for the Department's use such as monetary penalties similar to 
those in long term care facilities. 
- 3 -
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The Department is more than happy to work with the Legislature to address 
the limitations of the existing laws and regulations and to add specificity, 
as necessary, regarding appropriate transfers and requirements pertaining to 
medical staf~ .. membersh.ip. 
3. What has been the role of "on call" physicians in the patient dumping 
incidents investigated by the Department, and what is the authority to 
sanction patient dumping by "on call physicians"? 
The role of the "on call" physician in patient dumping involves the 
hospital's inability to assure the availability of specialist physicians to 
respond, in person, when necessary, for the provision of basic emergency 
medical services. 
The Department has received approximately 20 complaints relating to 
inappropriate transfers. Within these complaints approximately a·J patient 
medical records have been reviewed. Of these, 3 were directly related to 
the unavailability of, or the refusal of, the specialty physician to respond 
in person. 
The overall responsibility for patient ~are and provision of basic emergency 
services in hospitals lies with the governing body of each hospital and its 
medical staff. The Department of Health Services does not license 
-33-
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physicians. Scope of practice issues and monitoring of physician activities 
are not within the authority of the Department. 
The Department's authority to sanction patient dumping by "on call" 
physicians is, therefore, limited to the issuing of non-compliances relating 
to governing body and medical staff bylaws, rules and regulations. 
Let me re-emphasize the Department's willingness to work with the Legislature in 
addressing the limitations of the existing laws and regulations and to add 
specificity, as necessary, regarding inappropriate transfers and requirements 
pertaining to medical staff membership. 
Thank you again for the opportunity to present this testimony. 















PATIENT TRANSFER SURVEILLANCE 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
GAIL V. ANDERSON 1 M.D. 
MR. LUCIEN WULSIN, JR. 
ASSEMBLY SPECIAL COMMITTEE 
ON MEDI-GAL OVERSIGHT 
COMMITTEE HEARING ON PATIENT TRANSFER 
PROBLEMS IN CALIFORNIA 
MUSEUM OF SCIENCE & INDUSTRY 
LOS ANGELES 1 CALIFORNIA 
NOVEMBER 19 1 1986 AT 10:00 A.M. 
My name is Gail v. Anderson, M.D. I work for the County of 
Los Angeles as Director of the Department of Emergency Medicine 
at Los Angeles County/University of Southern California Medical 
Center. I have functioned in this capacity for the past 15 years. 
In addition, on a "day-to ... day", "moment-by-moment" basis, I 
am responsible for the operations of the Medical Alert Center for 
the Department of Health Services of Los Angeles County. It is 
this "Medical Alert Center" that coordinates the transfer of patients 
from community emergency departments and hospital beds to the 
hospitals (LAC/USC Medical Center, Harbor UCLA, Martin Luther King, 
Olive View, etc.) under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health 
Services. The acronym "MAC" through the years has come to mean many 
things to many people. Some praise it highly, others feel it is the 
main impediment to "quick and easy" transfer of patients without 
insurance or other resources to pay for medical care. 
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While the Medical Alert Center also coordinates the medical 
response to disasters (Triage Team UCLA, I 
LAC/USC) and to di accidents, its function is the 
coordination of appropriate and safe transfer of from 
community (private) hospitals to those operated by the Department 
of Health Services. However the problem of obstetrical overload 
(7,000 patients last year) and other special situations, may 
the MAC's assistance in arranging for safe and 
to hospitals outside the DHS hospitals. 
transfer 
LAC/USC Medical Center is the designated catchment transfer DHS 
hospital for some seventy (70) community (pri tals. Harbor/ 
UCLA and Olive View are the designated (catchment) DHS hospitals 
for some twently (20) hospitals each, and MLK is the designated hospital 
for three (3). While the daily census at LAC/USC Medical Center 
exceeds 1,500 1 the daily births exceed 50 and the combined emergency 
patients seen in the emergency sections 
Psychiatric and Pediatric Hospi exceed 
All hospitals in the DHS operate in a "capaci 
tal, Women's, 
ents per day . 
level". 
While the Department of Mental Health is said to as an 
independent branch of health care, the dai associated with 
transfer of mentally ill patients indicate considerable dependency 




The patient transfer guidelines, procedures and surveillance of 
these transfers between hospital facilities (both private and public) 
are necessarily e.volutionary in nat·ure and design. 
While a given impetus for definition of reasonable and accept-
able standard safe transfer of patients between hospitals may derive 
from a receiver of transferred patients (DHS hospitals), the actual 
definition of standards and their implementation require action by 
the Joint Commission of Hospitals, the Department of Health Services, 
as well as the California Legislature. In addition to these, on a 
local level, Los Angeles County has been fortunate to have had active 
and direct participation by the Hospital Council of Southern Califor-
nia, Los Angeles County Medical Association, Emergency Medical 
Services Conmdssion and the Emergency Care Advisory Committee. 
The enclosed documents detail the procedures for transfer of 
patients: what is considered appropriate; what is inappropriate; 
and what are unacceptable transfers. This list includes psychiatric, 
as well as medically ill and injured patients. In addition, the 
special situation of burn, special care transfer, obstetrical, and 
decompression emergency transfer requirements are included. 
Finally the surveillance requirements and procedures are included 
in the packet. The Department of Health Services' Problem T~ansfer 
Reporting Pr.ocedure provides for written notification of the referring 
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community hospital when a Problem Transfer Report has been filed by 
the receiving County Hospital. However to this submission, 
or "judgement calls" that might not be upon a more 
senior and experienced staff. 
Cases judged to be and abuse are referred directly to 
Health Facilities, where the transfer is inves on a 
more vigorous basis. 
SUMMARY: 
The evolution of the above has resulted a marked 
reduction in the number of and and abuse" 
transfer of patients to DHS the 10 years. 
At LAC/USC Medical Center, senior staff on continuous call for the 
Medical Alert Center review the transfer on a weekly 
basis. We urge direct contact, as well as written contact 
with the referring hospital a transfer. However, 
our objective has been more to "inform" and "educate" rather than 
to be punitive or threatening. the 10 years we have 
seen a reduction of 20 cases per week, to 3 to 4 per week with a 
significant reduction in the more te and neglect 





In the immediate past and for the present, State Legislation, 
and regulations of Department of Health Services and JCAH, as well as 
support from local organizations have been sufficient. 
Change in both reimbursement as well as responsibilities for 
the health care of the indigent (and Medically Indigent Adults) 
may make more legal constraints necessary. However, additional'laws 
and penalties will on1y encourage more suits, make more work for 
lawyers, tie up more court time and create unnecessary conflicts 
between physicians, nurses, and other health care professionals. 
Eliminate the term "dumping". Patients are not dirt on 





MEDICAL A~ERT CENTER 
ORGANIZATION 
The Medical Alert Center CMAC> reports directly to the Director of the Department 
of Emergency Medicine at the LAC/USC Medical Center. It )rovldes emergency commu-
nication, dispatching and transfer management for alI Department of Health Services 
facilities. It is located }n, and staffed by the Department of Emergency Medicine 
at the LAC/USC Medical Center. It Is continuously manned and operational 24 hours 
per day. An array of communication equipment is at hand including dedicated "ring-
down" lines to Harbor General Hospital and to major public safety agencies. 
PATIENT TRANSFER FUNCTIONS 
The Medical Alert Center controls alI patient transfers from community hospitals 
in the LAC/USC Medical Center catchment area. AI I cal Is from private hospitals 
in this area are received there and the transfer mode ("stat", paramedic-manned 
ambulance, etc.). is determined there. In addition, all calls requesting transfer 
to Martin luther King are handled by Medical Alert Center, os are most of the 
cal Is for transfer to Olive View. 
Harbor Genera I Hosp l ta I arranges most of its own incoming. transfers. There are 
only two circumstances in which the Medical Alert Center wi II ever make patient 
placements into Harbor General Hospital: 
1. If such transfer is in furtherance of overload-balancing 
and the patient is neither too iII for transport nor so 
lightly iII as to require only brief or minimal hospita! 
care. 
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2. If a community hospital in the Harbor catchment area 
has been "refused" for any reason by the medical staff 
at Harbor Genera J,• the community hosp ita I has one of 
three options: a) keeping patient themselves (an option 
very rarely exercised) b) hiring private transportation 
to move the patient to Harbor (or elsewhere) without County 
acceptance c) cal ltng MAC. Usually the last option Is 
exercised. The call to MAC from a Harbor General Hospital-
area hospital wi II result in transfer to Harbor General, 
unless Harbor General is disproportionately over committed 
in the r.equired service. 
Since the "patient imbalance" crisis of October 1977, the MAC assumed the additional 
responslbi llty for balancing the patlent overload among the Department of Health 
Services acute care hospitals. Every eight hours, aval lable bed counts are for-
warded to the MAC from the Administrative Nursing O~flce of each hospital <LAC/USC, 
MLK, HGH and Olive VIew) in the following categories: general medical, medical !CU, 
general surgical, surgical ICU and neurosurgery ICU. Against this proportion of 
aval fable beds Cor, more accurately, against the proportion of least over crowding) 
some transfers from outside traditional catchment areas occur. Great atteotion is 
directed to ensuring patient safety; critically unstable patients are directed to 
the nearest DHS institution. Those likely to require only brief outpatient treat-
ment or short hospital observation; e.g., light "OD's" now lavaged and awake) are 
not subjected to distant diversion. Rarely, patients wi I I be taken from pre-admitted 
status at one County Institution and transportated to another Department of Health 
Services fact lity better able (less severely overcrowded) to provide care. 
In order to make this system workable, the Director of the Department of Health 
Services during 1977 conferred on the MAC the final authority for alI diversions or 
transfers between Department of Health Services faci llties. Such transfers are 
always accomplished in strict accord with the considerations outlined above. Oc-
casionally, errors occur. For example, although every attempt is made to understand 
each patient's clinical situation, misinformation is sometimes obtained from the 
community hospital sending the patient. AI I such "problem transfers" are reported 
Immediately. Misjudgements in overload-balancing wi I I be corrected with subsequent 
patients - there is a very heavy presumption against two transfers for any single in-
dividual. To ensure this, only the MAC can order patient transportation between the 
four Department of Health Services acute care institutions. 
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• 
The Medical Alert Center cooperates with hospitals In coping with any unusual 
circumstances which are brought to its attention through the proper administrative 
channels. If any hospital experiences sudden disabilities; i.e., unusual absences 
among key staff, closure of wards or operating rooms because of contamination, etc. 
MAC wl I I readjust patient transfer balancing In light of these realities. Similarly 
MAC operates under the external realities of faci llty accessibility existing In the 
private medical community. 
CATCHMENT AREAS 
LAC/USC MEDICAL CENTER 
Alhambra Community Hospital 
Antelope Valley Hospital 
Arcadia Methodist Hospital (Methodist Hospital of Southern California) 
Barlow Hospital 
Bel !wood General Hospital 
Beverly Hi I Is Medical Center 
Beverly Medical Center 
Brotman Memorial Hospital 
California Hospital 
Cedars Sinai Medical Center 
Centinela Val ley Hospital 
Century City Hospital 
Century Community Hospital 
Children's Hospital of Los Angeles 
Coast Plaza Hospital 
Community Hospital of Los Angeles 
Daniel Freeman Hospital 
Doctor's Hospital of East Los Angeles 
Doctor's Hospital of Lakewood 
Downey Community Hospital 
Foothi I I Presbyterian Hospital 
Garfield Hospital 
Glendale Adventist Medical Center- Chevy Chase 
Glendale Adventist Medical Center - Wi !son Terrace 
Glendale Memorial Hospital 
Glendale Community Hospital 
Good Samaritan Hospital 
Granada Hi I Is Hospital 
Greater El Monte Hospital 
Henry Mayo- Newhal I Memorial Hospital 
Hollywood Community Hospital 
Hoi lywood Presbyterian Hospital 
Holy Cross Hospital 
Huntington Memorial Hospital 
Inter Community Hospital of Covina 
Kaiser Hospital -Bel If lower 
Kaiser Hospital - Los Angeles 
Kaiser Hospital - West Los Angeles 
La Mirada Community Hospital 
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CATCH~ENT AREAS <Continued) 
LAC/USC MEDICAL CENTER 
Lancaster Community Hospital 
Los Angeles Doctor's Hospital 
Monrovia CommunIty Hos.p ita I 
Monterey Park Community Hospital 
Newhal I Community Hospital 
Norwalk Community Hospital 
Orthopedic Hospital 
. Palmdale General Hospital 
Pico Rivera Community 
Pioneer Hospital 
Pomona Val ley Hospital 
Presbyterian Inter Community Hospital 
Queen of Angels Mospital 
Queen of the Val ley Hospital 
Rio Hondo Hospital 
St. Luke Hospital 
St. Vincent Hospital 
San Dimas Community Hospital 
San Gabriel Community Hospital 
Santa Marta Hospital 
Santa Teresita Hospital 
Sierra Vista Hospital 
Southeast Doctor's Hospital 
U.C.L.A. Medical Center 
Verdugo Hi I Is Hospital 
Washington Hospital 
West Covina Hospital 
Westside Hospital 
White Memorial Hospital 
Whittier Hospital 
HARBOR-UCLA 
Avalon Memorial Hospital 
Bay Harbor Hospital 
Bauer-St. Mary's Hospital 
Dominquez Val ley Hospital 
Daniel Freeman -Marina 
Gardena Medical Center 
Gardena Memorial Hospital 
Hawthorne Memorial Hospital 
Kaiser Hospital - Harbor City 
Little Company of Mary 
Long Beach Community Hospital 
Long Beach Memorial 
Malibu Medical Center 
Pacific Hospital 
St. John's Hospital 
San Pedro Peninsula Hospital 
Santa Monica Hospital 




MARTIN LUTHER KING 
Century Community Hospital 
Huntington Park Community Hospital 
St. Francis Hospital 
OLIVE VIEW 
Burbank Community Hospital 
Canoga Park Hospital 
Encino Hospital 
Granada Hi lis Hospital 
Kaiser Hospital -Panorama City 
Lakeview Medical Center 
Medical Center of North Hoi lywood 
Medical Center of Tarzana 
Panorama City Community 
Northridge Hospital 
St. Joseph's Medical Center 
San Fernando Hospital 
Serra Memorial Hospital 
Sherman Oaks Hospital 
Valley Presbyterian Hospital 
Valley Medical Center 
West Hi I Is Hospital 
Westlake Hospital 
West Park Hospital 
SPECIALIZED PLACEMENTS AND TRANSFERS 08 
Since June of 1976, when the obstetrics service at Women's Hospital, LAC/USC 
Medical Center was greatly overloaded, MAC has been arranging the transfer of 
some patients in relatively early labor to other Department of Health Services 
CMLK and HGH) and when they are also ful I, to the community hospitals currently 
cooperating in this program- Cedars Sinai, Lakeview, St. Joseph's, U.C.L.A., 
White Memorial and Whittier. A recent revision now provides for the "automatic" 
acceptance and transfer of two patients to HGH and one to MLK per 24 hours. 
NEUROSURGERY 
Acute neruosurgery patients (usually trauma) are specially handled by MAC. Neuro-
surgery ICU beds at HGH, MLK and LAC/USC Medical Center are the subject of a 
separate census report every eight hours. Under agreements reached among senior 
faculty of each institution, MAC manages the transfer of acutely-injured patients 
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NEUROSURGERY - Continued 
to the faci llty least overcommitted. • It is recognized that this often works a 
substantial hardship upon both the neurosurgical staff and upon the patient. 
However, transfers out of lar catchment areas are arranged only when the 
closest facility is substantial !y overcrowded in comparison with one or both 
of the other neurosurgery services. 
BURNS 
By agreement among the thr~e community hospitals providing specialized burn 
patient care (Brotman Memorial, Sherman Oaks and Torrance Memorial) and with 
the faculty of the burn ward at LAC/USC Medical Center, MAC arranges the most 
appropriate placement for alI acute burn cases occurring ln or around Los 
Angeles County. 
OTHER SERVICES - H.E.A.R. SYSTEM 
On behalf of the Hospital Counci I of Southern California, MAC serves as the 
management agency for traffic on the H.E.A.R. system (Hospital Emergency . 
Administrative Radio), broadcasting special messages including requests for 
blood, alerts from local law enforcement agencies, etc., and Air Quality 
Management District alerts. 
DISASTER OPERATIONS 
In response to disaster incidents, the MAC activates the hospital system via the 
H.E.A.R. network, dispatches triage teams, (HGH, UCLA and LAC/USC) coordinates 
additional patient care resources and manages casualty dispersal. It conducts 
frequent communication exercises of these functions. 
HELICOPTER OPERATIONS 
By agreement withal I pub! ic service agencies operating helicopters capable of 
patient transport, a! I requests for inter-hospital transfers are routed to MAC, 
which also arranges for ground ambulance links and other necessary steps. Requests 
for helicopter evacuations from all County hospitals should be placed directly with 
MAC. 
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PROCEDOJ\E FOR TIANSFE!l··OF PA'l'IEN'l'S 
'1'0 HOSPI~ALS OPERATED B~ 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPAR~MEN'!' OF . HEALTH SERVICES 
Effective Date: :·March '22, '19.82 
'l'he Joint Commission on Accreditation ~f-Eospitals (J~). stated 
as ·its principal tenet for emergency service "'that:. .· 
. "Ac!equate··appraisal,·.and .a·dviee or initial treatment, · • 
shall be rendered to any ~ll or injured person who 
presents himself at the ·hospital ••• " 
,, ... . •·· 
.It may occasionally become necessary to tra.!'I.Sfer a patient because :ij 
the facility is not.able to manage the specific medical problem 
or does not have the capacity to accept the patient. 
Because. County Hospitals are often the recipient of s~ch tran~fe~, 
· t.~e 'following quicelines have been formulated in accordance with ' 
JCAH standards and California statutes. ·. 
IF I'l' BECOMES NECESSARY TO TRANSFER A PATIENT -ro ANOTHER FACILITY: 
I. Administer Essential Li!'e-Saving Ueasures: 
The inte::pretaticn of JCAB S~ANDAi\.0 I for Emergency Service 
states: wThe referring hospital must institute essential 
life-saving measures, anc provide emergency procedures that :: 
w;.l '· n'ini!!'.i%'! !.'=grav.•!.tio::. cf -:.he eo~:! ticn !w=in; tra.r,spY4i.&• ··.! 
tion." 
II. :Care Of Patient Prior to Transfer: 
Before a request to transfer a patient is made, the appropriate 
medical protocols {Atta~~ments l-6) should be reviewed. They 
are intended for use only as initial guidelines, and do not 
guarantee acceptance -of the patient. 
III. Call The Facility To Which The Patient Is To Be Transferred: 
A. County facilities: 
,. 
Harbor/UCLA Medical Center 
Martin Luther King, Jr. General Hospital 
· Olive View/Hidvalley 






(IF -DIFFICULTY IS ENCOUNTERED IN -cONTACTING MfY COtnrrY 
HOSPITAL, THE LAC/USC MEDICAL CENTER MEDICA~ ALERT 




!f the MAC is contacted, an En\Eu·ge:ncy Patient ~ran1far 
Coordinator (EPTC) will answer and identify hiJuualf 
as Opera tor ~ • ~e H.AC coordinators are directly 
supervised by physicians who are of :the 
Department of Emergency Medicine. are the 




Transfer Coordinators, with physician supervision, 
will evaluate all requests ~y outside hospitals 
for transfer of patients to County facilities. 
Clinical conc!ition, -current vital s a..•·ui interim 
supportive measures will also at that 
time. 
If the Transfer Coordinator•s initial evaluation 
is that t~9 patient is in critical conditio~, the 
MAC Medical supervisor will evaluate the. request' 
·prior to acce~tinq transfer to determine steps 
necessary to sa£equard the 1 S condition 
· during transportation. 
3. Onder no circumstances will a.."1y be 
transferred to a County facility without notif~-
cation and approval for trans by ~~e Transfer 
Coordinator or upon request the transferring 
physician, by the HAC Medical Supervisor. Patients 
sent ·without approval will revi und~r th~ 
?roblem Transfer Reporting 
4. At any ti~e, the trans:errinq physician may request 
to speak directly wit.~ the MAC !·1edical Supervisor; 
at times, the Medical Supervisor request to 
speak directly with the trans physician. 
5. Co~~ty Hospitals do not have an unlimited capacity. 
On occasion, therefore, a trans may be denied 
6. 
or deferred. Every effort, however, will be made 
to help place the patient in such cases. 
kny patient, no matter how 
whom the care availab a 
be life-saving wi~l be accepted 
Retrospective audits will be 
patie...T'lt whose 
prior to arrival. 





B. 'The MAC does not become 
patients between private 
assist .in cases of bU-'""ns, 
private 
, thev will 
, and"' cues 
transpor""..J!. tion, re~uiring complicated 
e.g. ; helicopt-er · 
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Patient sent without agreed 
equipment .. · 
D. Patient sent·without·medical re 
of diagnstie ·tests (lab, x-ray, 
E. Patient subje~t to excessive 
These reports will be reviewed 
Procedure (see Exhibits A ane B). 
RID·ml·iBER THESE THREE STEPS 
1. Administer essential life-savinq measures 
2. ·Ca~l the appropriate County Hospital 
3. Send copies of all pertinent 
procedures, x-rays, etc. 
Your cooperation will assist Coun Hos 
efiicient and effective care to emergen 
. ' 
;"' 
P~C:EDO?.E FOR TRANSF~ OF PA~I~~~S 
Paqe 5 
· PSYCHIATRIC PATIE};'!'S NOT MEDICALLY ILL 
a.na. 
1 the follw• 
by the Los 
emergency 11"'111:.1t.f,.." 
·For -patients with -mental illness who have 
£o~~d to have no acute medical/surg;eal 
in~ psychiatric facilities have ~een 
County Department of Mental Health to 
ev~luation and treatment services. nea::est of these 
should be contacted about disposition 
.the above category who are in need 
·ant: treatment • 
.. 
Facility 
Psychiatric "-Bospi tal/Los An.geles 
County-OSC Medical Center 
Olive View Medical Center 
A.!. Hawkins Crisis Evaluation Oni 
1·!art.in Luther King 1 Jr. General ,.. ___ ,.:..__, 
•• ...,_, 1:"• ,., ....... 
~.A. County Crisis Evaluation Unit/ 
!!etropo li tan State Hospital 
Emergency Dept./Harbor-UCLA 
Medical Center 








:' I .. 
COt:~ 'TY OF LOS ANGELES • l)EI~\RTM&'IT OF HEALTH SERVICES 
-· 
'!'he Department of Health ·Services' Problem Transfer Reporting Procedure 
provides for written notificatio~ to ~~e referring community hospital 
when a Problem T:~~sfer Re~ort has been filed by the rec~iving County 
hcs?ital. The Emergency Medical Systems Division has been given the .. 
responsibility f9r this notification and for following up with commuQi~. 
hos?itals in the ~nterest of improving the emergency health care deliv 
system by identifying and correcting problems ~~at ±nterfere with the 
delivery af optimwn health care services.· 
We have been notified ·.by ~~at a patient 







Date and Time Received: 
I 
Admitting Diagnosis at County Facility: 
Referring ~hysiei~: 
Problem(s) Noted: 
sent without notification 
-----sent without acceptance 
sent without adeauate medical r~cord.s 
-----sent without agreed attendants 
sent without agreed equipment 
-----·definitive treatment could and should have been 
handl~d by transferring hospital emergency room 









: I ILITY TRANSFER 
BY AMBULANCE 
RE 
guidelines for ambulance tran 
tween health facilities. 
is policy is not intended 
ities of Advanced Life Support personnel 
called to a health facility specif 
a medical emergency. In such circums 
paramedics shall comply wi 
i emergency response activities 
Unstable patients, or patients likely 
in transrt, should not be trans 
ital which is capable of providi 
ired medical c~re. 
rring facility shall comply 
irements· of applicable statute, 
itation requirements governi 
fication of and acceptance by 
ili , transmittal of appropriate 
17 
from 
s, notification of patient and etc. 
ided by Health & Safety Code t 
neral acute care hospital 11 
r a ~atient for non medical reasons 
health facility unless the il 
the person agrees in advance f 
r to accept the transfer. 
responsibility of the transferri 
ic an, in consultation with rece 
ian, to determine the appropria 
and the appropriate medical 
, RN/CCN/MICN, etc.) to 
172 
care during transport. , a 




















ich will the 





seems likely to 
the transfer, 




















SUBJECT: INTERFACILITY TRANSFER 
BY AMBULANCE 
4. Arrangements to ~ransfer with the 
information and laboratory find 
continuing care of the patient 
should include, at a minimum, t 
limited to: a brief description 
medical history, physical examinat 
the transferring hospital; a work 
·reason for transfer1 results of al 
able diagnostic tests, x-ray films 
efforts to contact physician consultants 
activate operating rooms or other 
necessary to provide definitive care. 
s. Time-critical transfers shall not 
studies that are not pertinent 
performance might unduly delay 







NOTE: Re rs to the transfer of an acute i or 
c. 
unstable trauma·patient from a hospi to 
Center .. 
1. Prior to patient transfer, the trans rr 
shall ensure or provide the fol 
a. A 
b. Supplemental oxygen 
c. Large bore IV (NOTE: If 
are to i used ing 
Care Ambulance Transfer" 
f. (e.g. 
r) 
g. Hematocrit (NOTE: results 
to rece i sicians) 
·NOTE: Refers to transfer of a patien 
documented or suspec cervical spine i 







1. Prior to transfer, the transferri 
D. 
ensure or provide i * 
a. A 




d. Ca iac monitoring 
e. 
f .. 
2 .. All avai 
l ine precaut 
to): 
, i 
backboa~, with the pat 
t the patient's head 
u t with the rd; 
Firm, wel fi 
r means of ing 
: the use of ices 
tract {e.g. tongs) is s 
nature ex 
quali a n 
CT scans or 
tients, 
laboratory 









r as a min 
rs to the transfer of a 
1 ing a trauma center) to 




















SUBJECT: INTERFACILITY TRANSFER 
BY AMBULANCE 
b. Supplemental oxygen 
c. Large bore IV 
d. Initiate fluid Resuscitation using an ted 
formula (e.g. Parkland) 
e. Arterial Blood Gases (if burn involves the head 
and/or neck; or if patient may have inhaled 
products of combustion or other hazardous/toxic 
gases) 
f. CBC, Electrolytes, BUN/Creatinine, ime/PTT 
g. Chest X-ray 
h. Tetanus prophylaxis 
2. Patients who meet trauma center criteria and have 
associated burns should be evaluated for trauma 
center treatment. 
3. After appropriate stabilization, physicians should 
contact the Medical Alert Center (MAC) at (213) 
221-4114 to arrange for transfer to a burn center. 
The following information should be prese if 
available: 
a. Age and sex 
b. Full extent of injuries known, -includi 
severity of burn(s) 
c.. Cause 
other) 
the burn(s) (e.g. chem 1, f 
d. When the burn occurred 
e. Medical measures provided/laboratory ta 
E. , GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFERRING DECOMPRESSION EMERGENCY 
PATIENTS: 
NOTE: Refers to the transfer of critically ill patients 
suffering from decompression emergencies -- as air 
embolism -- who are to be transferred from a hospital to 
a hyperbaric chamber facility 
1. Prior to patient transfer, the transferri ital 
shall ensure or provide the following: 
a. Controlled airway 

































I SUBJECT: INTERFACILITY TRANSFER REFEREN~E NO. 517 
l BY AMBULANCE t 
4. Pediatric patients requiring trauma center or burn 
center care should be transferred in the same manner 
as are other patients requiring these services •. 



















TRANSFL~ OF PATI~TS 
OPERATED BY LOS ANGELES 
OF HEALTH SERVICES 
the procedures for transferring patients 
lities reflects the following changes/ 
hospital assumes 
costs of transporting 
(Attachments 1-6) to 
to determine if 
used 
trans-
F. Hawkins Psychiatric 
, Jr. General 
System (Exhibits A & B). 
attention that many patients re-
for psychiatric evaluation or treat-
ment are to medical, rather th~ to psychiatric, 
emergency rooms. very much appreciate it if you would 
·request your sure that such patients are referred 
specifica11X to ~~~~~~emergency rooms. Appropriate referral 
will eliminate unnecess obtaining pschiat:ic evaluation 
and/or treatment. 
P:oblem System (Exhibit ·was established by 
the County to ensure receive qualitJ medical care 
before·, during, and a transfers from commu.."'lity hospitals to 





., .. ' 
~e Administrator/Chief ~xecutive Officer 
·Paqe 2 
Ma::-ch 22, 19 82 
: Communication, a form letter (Exhibit B) was developed for the 
purpose of notifying administrators after a problem has been 
· reported· to the Emergency Medical Systems Division, except for 
the following: . 
a. Suspected Neglect and/or'Abuse 
b. •sent without Acequate Stabilization" 
c. "Excessive Delay in Transfer• 
As illustrated in Exhibit A, this system encourages the continu-
ation of appropriate inter-hospital communications. 
Zf there is any question, please contact Patty Paul, Assistant 
t-1ana9er, Emer9ency Medical SysteinS Division, at 974-8297. 
RWt'l: r 
Attachments 
c. Hospital Council of Southern California 
Los Angeles County Medical Association 
Emergency Hedical Services Commission 
Emergency care Advisort Committee 
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California Association of Public Hospitals 
205 South Ellsworth, San Mateo CA 94401 415/348-3228 
Testimony Presented to the Joint Medi-Cal Oversight Committee 
Regarding Patient Dumping 
Carol B. Emmott, Executive Director 
Cheryl Gelder-Kogan, Director of Research 
California Association of Public Hospitals 
November 19, 1986 
Los Angeles 
We appreciate the opportunity to share with you our 
concerns regarding the increasingly prevalent pattern of patient 
dumping in California's health marketplace. As you know, Mr. 
Chairman, the California Association of Public Hospitals was one 
of the early and strong supporters of your AB 3403. We believe 
this legislation represents a modest but important enhancement of 
the State's enforcement power regarding the current standard of 
hospital practices with respect to the needs of clinically 
unstable emergency patients. With the signif new economic 
pressures on the private health care market place, we believe 
this measure is not only timely, but also sensitive to the need 
for fairness and due process. 
We believe that the author and sponsors of this measure 
were quite reasonable in their accomodation of concerns of 
the California Hospital Association and other parties and feel 
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that the accords reached were, for the most part, sensible and 
responsible with respect to both the needs of patients and 
hospitals. We regret, however, that some cribical interest 
groups were less willing to engage in constructive negotiations 
regarding possible improvements in this important patient 
protection measure. 
Very briefly, we would like to address two subjects of 
relevance to the legislation. First, we would like to summarize 
what we know today about the scope of the problem and outline our 
plans to supplement that information with a survey of our 
membership over the next few months. Secondly, we would like to 
review newly available data which is reflective of the health 
care financing burdens imposed on private providers subsequent to 
the 1982 reforms. 
First, we would like to highlight what we have learned 
from the two patient transfer surveys: one conducted by the 
National Association of Public Hospitals (NAPH) and one conducted 
by the San Bernardino County Medical Center. One overall finding 
from both of these surveys is that a significant proportion of 
patient transfers to public hosptials were completed according to 
proper protocols. Most public hospitals believe that clinically 
stable transfers, of both sponsored and unsponsored patients, are 
appropriate as long 
safety are followed 
necessary capacity. 
With that 
results of the two 
as established protocols 
and the public receiving 





hospital has the 
summarize the 
• 
The NAPH survey, which identified 1,066 transferred 
patients in 26 hospitals located in 12 dif 
o 47 percent were self-pay; 
o 13 percent were Medicaid recipients; 
o 13.4 percent had private insurance; 
o 11 percent were Medicare benefic 
o and another 11 percent had some 
of third-party coverage . 
states, found: 
Seventy two and one-half percent of the transferred patients 
required emergent care. Fifteen percent of those patients 
arrived in the public hospital with "no paperwork," a strong 
indication that there had been no contact between the sending and 
receiving institution. We must infer that it is group of 
transfers that constitutes the problem which needs to be 
addressed. 
The San Bernardino patient trans s that 91% 
of their patient transfers were due to economic reasons: 
0 11 percent were MIAS; 
0 15 percent were Medi-Cal recipients; 
0 69 percent were self-pay. 
One hundred twenty three (or 29 percent) of transferred 
patients arrived at the county hospital unannounced -- the 
sending hospital failed to follow proper protocol get 
approval from the receiving hospital. Of these 8 percent of 
the patients were deemed clinically unstable, ing in one 
death. Again, this is the group which needs at The 
patients who are transferred to public hospitals are 
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3 
regardless of sponsorship, are viewed as appropriate transfers. 
The San Bernardino study found 9 percent of these 
transferred to their facility were because of need 
specialized care not available at the sending These 
transfers are quite appropriate -- as long as 
hospital has the capacity, they are notified advance and the 
patient is clinically stable at the time of 
Thus, these results demonstrate that the ority of the 
transfers, while they may be due to the economic situation of the 
patient and pressures on providers, are deemed proper transfers. 
It is the small group of clinically unstable trans , or those 
where proper protocols are not followed, that must be addressed. 
Another issue we would like to address turns on a 
related, but somewhat tangential financial issue 
unfortunately made a significant cont~ibution to 
this legislation in the 1985-1986 session. We are 
se of 
sympathetic with pressures that are being placed on public and 'f·-iv* 
providers alike in the highly competitive Cali lth care 
marketplace. Unlike some elements in the industry, we 
the fundamental shift to a competitive approach to control of 
health cost inflation, preferring instead a more rational, but 
aggressive approach designed and implemented 1 1 of 
State policymaking. Obviously, these preferences were not heeded 
and California has led the way toward a competit approach to 
constraining health care costs. Unleashing these and the 
consequent shift from cost-related reimbursement to a lly 
different approach to Medicare reimbursement a most penurious 
Medi-Cal contracting system have put substantial pressures on all 
4 
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providers. In addition to these forces, as you 
payers are bargaining aggressively for simi 
arrangements. These private payer dynamics are 
broader impact on the private provider sector 





worrying about substantial revenues from 
addition, the 1983 transfer of the Medically 
contributed significantly to the underfunding 
systems and to some relatively modest increases 




the bad debt 
We have been relatively successful 
private hospital community to understand the re 
contribution of emergency care to former MIAs 
the overall financial pressures in the industry. 
the physician community has been less cognizant 
these facts. Because of the importance that 
private sector losses played in the debate 
is important to take this opportunity to set 
regarding the role of potentially MIA-related 
scheme of private sector health economics. 
The lowing table summarizes the 
and charity care across various segments of 
ses 
s 
industry. (Data are adjusted to control fey f 
patterns and have been calculated in 198!-8~ constant 














BAD DEBT & CHARITY CARE (RCC adju d) 















0 Di!atric:t o Non-profit A County 
Comparable rates of increase in real, not cost 
burdens, comparing 1981-82 to 1984-85, show count to 
increased their burden 172.7 percent. Non-profits 
their burden by 36.9 percent, investor-owned by 24 and 
districts by 20.6 percent, with private increases 
less than 25 percent of the total statewide 
While this increased burden is considerable, it is 
important to note that the increases in both absolute 1 and 
percentages pale beside increased losses from sources. For 
6 
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example, using reported figures, private losses 
have increased no less than $957 million or 9 
have increased $392 86 4 
percent and " lowances," presumably to 
private sector discounts, have gone up $65 . 3 
percent. Using unadjusted, thus comparable, 
figures shows that the private increase 
constitutes only 13.3 percent of some $1,630,399,9 
private reported losses. It is also of 
during this period, after allowing for all 
facili reported an increasing level of net 
$486 
11 deep 
1 in 1981-82 to $960.8 mil 
What this data shows is an increased 
care burden from the 1981-82 
o many other dynamics other than 
to these patterns --
of dependents and other 
during and subsequent 
and 
o as noted above, the uncompensated 
contributes only approximately 13 
new underfunding burden on Cali 
How some private providers feel 
care financing dilemma by turning to 
1 
11 role to compensate for pressures 
other payor dynamics continues to elude us. 
Better, we think is division of 
can 
issues from single issue addressed AB 340 
7 
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meaningful enforcement of existing requirements 
unstable emergency patients. In addition, we would 
opportunity to work with all segments of the Legis 
provider commun~ty toward more adequate financing 
care 
programs and development of new revenue streams can assure 
maintenance of our societal goals of fairness and j the 
context of the new health care business climate. 
In summary, Mr. Chairman, we are most to 
you in any way we can to ensure passage of this measure 
coming session. We will be attempting to improve the information 
base regarding the frequency and nature of economic 
particularly the clinically inappropriate patients. , we are 
hopeful that all elements in the provider communi 11 come to 
appreciate a more complete assessment of the financing 
besetting our industry. With this kind of candor 
perhaps we can develop a more comprehensive and rat 
to addressing these complex financial problems. We 
it is critical that all major provider groups who are 
about protection of the public from some of the 
downside risks of competition work together to 
availability of an adequate level of humane care for 1. 
Obviously, we have many further tasks in insuring more 
payment programs and insuring expansion of these 
for those who currently impose unaffordable losses on 
and private providers alike. However, current lack 
about the demographics of the population as well as 
ion 
programs 
complexities imposed by the Gann expenditure limits no 




forthcoming. Therefore, the least we can do in short term is 
to a minimum of patient harm while we work aggressively 
and lective together to develop and advovcate for more sound 





Caltfomia Aaociation of Public Hospitals 
205 South Ellsworth. San Mateo CA 94401 415/348-3228 
December 5, 1986 
The Honorable Burt M. Margolin 
The State Capital 
Room 6011 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Burt: 
I am enclosing a statement we are presenting this to the 
Little Hoover Commissions' Hearing on the Medi-Cal Program. You 
will see on pages 11 through 13 a revision of the analysis we 
presented to your Comm~ttee on November 19th regarding bad 
debt and charity care trends in 1981-82 constant dollars. 
As you may recall this analysis was particularly 
subject of county payment practices regarding 
emergency care. You may recall that the first 
undertook with the new 1984-85 data showed a 
prLvate sector burden on some S90 million. Since 
surprised at these results during the preparation 
your hearing, I reviewed the computer model that we 






have now had the opportunity to go back and this 
anaylsis manually. The technique we followed was as lows: we 
took the bad debt and charity data reported by each sector of the 
industry in 1981-82, adjusted it by ratios of costs to 
projected that level of burden ahead based on sector's 
increase in operating expenses per patient day to what 
the same burden would have cost in the subsequent years, based on 
the cost structure of those years. We then compared the actual 
cost-adjusted bad debt and charity for each of the subsequent 
years for each sector of the industry to the cost- adjusted 1981-
82 standard to derive a net increase or decrease in As 
can see from the enclosed narrative, this analysis suggests a 
net decrease of some $3 million in the overall 1984-85 private sector 
burden as compared with 1981-82 standards - a much 
more in line with an analysis we had done on earlier 
-73-
I regret having to make this correction. I suppose one 
correction in nearly four years of reporting rather complex 
analyses is not too bad a track record. I do regret it, however, 
and hope that we've not imposed excessive confusion on an already 
complicated issue. _ 
Incidentally, congratulations on your impressive re-election. We 
look forward to getting together with you in the next few weeks 





cc: George Cate, California Medical Association 







D. Vice President, California 
• • • R.) 
Bill and Patient 
, I am sorry that I am not able 
hospital responsibilities here 
this letter will give you 
,do the bulk of the care in the 
in this State--for the anti-dumping 
that a strong anti-dumping bill wil 
here in the public hospitals that 
and nursing 
welcome and a definite step 
and enforcment mechanisms. 
, where press coverage 
ordinances in 
to Highland with stab 
with a fracture 
And 
medical, and obstetric--are 
the sickest of the sick here 
the bill must 
the Counties in their quest 


















COUNTY OF ORANGE TESTIMONY 
NOVEMBER 19, 1986 
I am Herbert Rosenzweig, the Director of Medi 
Orange, Health Care Agency. I am here this morning 
problem of patient dumping, that is, the transfer c 
ces 
from private hospital emergency rooms to public emergency rooms. 
say that is problem in Orange County has been y 
pa ent dumping of critically ill patients almost never occurs 
Orange County has taken several actions to mitiga 
dum pi 
hospitals 
rst of these actions involved contrac ng 




I am happy to 
In fact, 
present 
ce of patient 
i rty-two 1 oca1 
The 




of the contract is excluded 
Cou an additional agreement with UCIMC 





igibility process increasing access 
zed up to $50,000 to reimburse 
vi es to promote increased partici 
professional problems. 
often overlooked when addressing 
system. The Orange County EMS 
provider and the local EMS 
pre-hospital system directs seriously ill 
speci c hospi s that are staffed and equipped to 














COUNTY OF ORANGE TESTIMONY 
NOVEMBER 19, 1986 
PAGE 2 
In order to monitor the MIA system, we have established a telephone hot 
line to provide general and eligibility information. A Standards Assurance unit 
staffed with two nurses and a doctor participate in resolution of problems that 
are brought to our attention by patients, providers, and community clinics. 
During July, August, and September, 1986, only 0.32% of the calls dealt with 
transfers. Compared to October, November, and December of 1985, when 5.3% of 
the calls were regarding transfers. Only 16% of telephone calls received by the 
Standards Assurance unit concerned problems; the remaining 84% are for 
information. Calls concerning access currently average only 7% of all calls. 
Issues in the program are resolved in two ways. A Medical Review Committee 
that has physicians appointed by the Hospital Council of Southern California, 
the fiscal intermediary, and the County meets monthly to review all claims for 
Home Health Services and to hear appeals of denied claims. The contract also 
establishes an Administrative Review Committee that has participation from all 
parties of the agreement. It also meets monthly to deal with policy questions 
or administrative problems. 
In conclusion, I would like to restate that in Orange County the problem of 
the improper transfer of critically ill patients for non-medical reasons is 
under excellent control. 
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Sherburne Jr. 
6343 Lincoln Ave C-3 
Buena Calif. 90620 
7 Home Phone 
OEC 'J 714-669-1760 Work Phone v 
Board of 
10 Civic Center Plaza 
Santa Ana, California 92701 
To ~'Jhom it may concern, 
What I am about to relate to you concerns each and everyone of us but I am 
this letter to you, the policy makers, and forbid this grim 
gross miss of the 24 HOUR EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE in 
should to you or any of yours. 
son 1 :15 PM on Wed. 
November 
assulted by a couple of muggers at 
. As a result he sustained a laceration to his upper 
1 
after investigating Buena Park Police Officers ved on the 
scene to Buena Park Community 
Medical Care. arrival at the hospital it was ascertained that my son's 
surgeons touch because of the 
wound. Buena Park did not have a 
my son to West anaheim, 
We were informed before leaving Buena Park that there 
be waiti for 
arrival at West Anaheim we were advised by the 
doctor 
but he wouldn 
sons 
be 
definately required the touch 
down th the hospital because 
of the 
so it was 
off Beach. 
someone would 
and the attending 
a surgeon 
was about to embark 
on a 
out 
and becuase my son's case was considered a cash account,(a case with-
medical insurance). Now because of the obvious fact that my son 
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(2) 
was first seen at Buena Park Community it was suggested that we return to 
them as there was nothing they could do. 
When we arrived back at Buena Park Community we were advised that nothing had 
changed but the atending nurse would make every attempt to get in touch with 
a plastic surgeon or at least someone that could help my son. She also stated 
that untill about two weeks ago they had a plastic surgeon on call but not at 
the present. 
Needless to say, the incident that took place that involved my son occurred at 
approsimately 11:15 PM and now it was about 1 AM and still no actual treatment 
had been performed of any kind on my son short of handing his a stack of 4X4s 
soaked with sterial saline. 
We, my son and I, firmly believe that the attending nurse at Buena Park not 
only recognized the severity of my son's wound and was doing her utmost to get 
some assistance for us, we both feel that it really wasn't a fair trade, the 
nurse spending all her talented time on the phone trying to raise someone to 
come to our aid when she should have been assisting a surgeon repairing my 
son's injury. After numerous attempts on the phone the nurse came up empty 
handed. 
Now what were we to do. My son was just laying in the Emergency Room of Buena 
Park, no doctor and I know he is suffering from a tremendous amount of pain. 
At about 1:15AM the only thing that the nurse could come up with was that I 
transport my son to UCI Medical Center. WORD OF CAUTION HOWEVER1 AFTER WE ARRIVE 
AT UCI DON'T MENTION THAT WE WERE FIRST SEEN AT BUENA PARK COMUNITY AS THEY 
MIGHT INSIST THAT WE RETURN AS WE WERE SEEN THERE FIRST. The identical sit-
uation as was displayed at West Anaheim could result. THEY EVEN COACHED US ON 
WHAT TO SAY, LIKE MY SON FELL IN OUR DRIVE WAY AT OUR APT COMPLEX AND THIS WAS 
FIRST PLACE WE CAME TO. 




of Buena Park and the fact 
that we return. I stated 
son was seen 
been turned 
Buena Park comunity and West anaheim because both 
were unable to perform the medical treatment for son didn't want 
to and UCI was my son s last resort. The doctor went say that this hap-
but where we mad pens al time we patients get mad in the 
to 
walked 
about it like make a call or write a letter than he 
The doctor came back in about five minutes and stated that would perform 









it would require that I remit a .00 
11 . I entered the office to initiate 
sons treatment about 1:50. I remember the time as the girl 
she could beat the computer as it goes down at 2 PM 
little relieved that something was 
was not untill my son came out of the 
after I the .00 the 
untill about 4 AM as there was 
within ear shot of were my son was 
at 11:15 PM and at 4 
that should have been 
final left UCI about 5:30 AM and 
before 6 AM. As a matter of fact 
Park 
be done for my 
Room that I 
Staff didn't 
dis-
. In other words 
he finally 
before. 
to our residence 
a ~ of a 
the board, we painted this scenario to let you know 
is very upset at the manner with the were treated. 
even UCI final that had to 
is the brand of EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE per-
County for others as less fortunate my son who 
Insurance, we shudder to think of the many others who 




My son and I wonder what would have happened if Buena Park Community was 
unable to get in touch with myself or any immediate family member? After 
all the ambulance that picked up my son at the crime scene just dropped him 
off at Buena Park and left. How long would my son have laid there in the 
emergency room without treatment? Would Buena Park Community have trans-
ported my son to UCI on their own as I did to seeking the treatment solely 
because they didn't have a plastic surgeon on call or couldn't locate one? 
What really amazes us is that both of the aforementioned hospitals with the 
exception of UCI display 24 HOUR EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE SIGNS IN FRONT OF 
THEIR ESTABLISHMENTS, WHAT GOOD DID THAT DO US? 
Please be advised that if any serious repercusSJons result from the distinct 
lack of immediate treatment from the three aforementioned medical organications, 
we will have no choice but to initiate another course of action. 
Jr. 
P.S. If you didn't have an opportunity to read one of the front page articles 
in the register dated 11/20/86, we suggest that you do so because it explains 
just what I have been trying to tell you. We submit to you, honored members of 
the Board of Supervisors, has anyone perished as theresult of our EMERGENCY 
MEDICAL CARE SYSTEM? Maybe not but us the citiz8n would have no way of finding 
out anyway would we? We wondery or for a better choice of words ponder ·this hol'l-
ever, HOVJ MANY MORE OTHER HUMAN BEINGS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE 
MURDEROUS TORTURE THAT MY SON DID BEFORE THIS PROBLEM IS CORRECTED? 
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CC. Mr Skip courtney/Administrator Buena Park Community Hospital 
Mr. John Hanshaw/Administrator West Anaheim Hospital 
Mr. Burt Margolin/ Assemblyman 




ASSEMBLYMAN LLOYD G. CONNELLY 
ASSEMBLYMAN PHILLIP ISENBERG 
ASSEMBLYMAN BILL LEONARD 




ASSEMBLYMAN BURT MARGOLIN 
CHAIRMAN 
OVERSIGHT HEARING ON 
PATIENT DUMPING OF THE MEDICALLY INDIGENT 
BRIEFING PAPER 
Hearst Theatre - Museum of Science and Industry 
700 State Drive - Los Angeles, California 
November 19, 1986 - 10:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m. 
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STATE CAPlTOL 
SACRAMENTO CA 95814 
LUCIEN WULS!I\i. JR 





This briefing per is organized as 11ows: 
Section Patient dumping studies and incident 
Section 2. The existing statutory framework 
Section 3. last year's proposed legislation. 
Appendix A. County policies regarding payment r privately 
provided emergency care. 
Appendix B. The pros and cons of a coun manda 
Appendix C. Uncompensated Care: Problems and Solutions. 










Wha s the extent of the patient d p Does it 
req re a state solution? 
What should be contained in a bill to aut rize 
intermediate range sanctions for patient dumping? 
Is patient dumping being caused a major crisis in the 
i an ing f emergency hospital ca e? 
If so what is that financing cris s, how should it be 
reso ved, should it be tacked on to a patient dumping 
bi1 
ent d mping is the denial of emergency hospital care to a 
itical condition for financial reas s. Usually, 
lways, the patient is trans rred ed to another 
- a co ty hospital, sometimes a hospital, 
i sa private hospital. 
Pati n transfers occur for financial reasons 
rcept on of the hospital or doctors that the wi 
- and for medical reasons, such as the hos i s 
provide the me ical care required. 
namely the 
1 not be paid 
nability to 
Finane a1 transfers of emergency patients are increasingly 
required under many recent contracts between hospi 1s and third 
par insurers. In these circumstances transfers are required 
after the initial treating hospital has trea d the patient's 
emergen and tabilized the patient's condition so that the 
trans r to the contracting hospital presents no ical danger 
to tht: patient. 
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Studies of patient dumping show that it can happen to anyone-
patients with private insurance, patients with Medi-Cal or 
Medicare, patients in counties which reimburse private hospitals 
for emergency care. It happens most frequently and most 
dangerously to patients who are uninsured, to minori patients, 
and to patients with Medi-Cal coverage. 
Patient dumping occurs to patients with many different 
medical conditions. Trauma dumps often involve car accident 
victims and crime victims with knife or gun shot wounds to the 
head, chest or abdomen. Other victims of dumping include women 
in active labor, adults and children with broken bones, and 
patients with internal bleeding or organ damage 
Treatment of a patient in an emergency condition requires the 
close cooperation of the hospital emergency room staff, the 
emergency room physician, and the "on call" physician. Emergency 
room physicians are ordinarily hired on a contractual basis by 
the hospital to staff its emergency room; they are specially 
trained and credentialed in emergency medicine. "On call" 
physicians are the physicians on the hospital s ff in the 
particular specialty required by the patient's needs. Depending 
on the patient's condition, the particular "on call" physician 
required to respond to an emergency may be a neurosurgeon, an 
obstetrician, or a general surgeon. Some hospi ls require all 
physicians on the hospital staff to serve "on c 11" on a rotating 
basis to the emergency room, while others rely on physicians 
volunteering to serve "on call". Some hospitals pay their 
medical staf who agree to be "on call"; these p nts may range 
from $100 a night to as high as $500 a night for certain 
specialists in certain geographic areas. 
At the outset, it is important to emphasize hat patient 
dumping can be initiated in two ways: the firs s a hospital 
poli of de ing care to persons deemed unable pay, and the 
secon is the "o call" physician's unwillingness to respond to a 
medical emergen involving an indigent patient r Medi-Cal 
recipient. 
SECTION I: PATIENT DUMPING STUDIES INCIDENTS 
A study of all patient transfers through the emergency room 
into Highland Hospital, Alameda County during a six month period 
in 1981 revealed the following: 63% had no coverage, 21% had 
Medicaid, 13% had Medicare, and 3% had private insurance. 45% 
were minority patients. 22% of the patients were at "high risk" 
from the transfer. 7% of the patients actually suffered 
substandard care due to the transfer in the unanimous opinion of 
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institutions even before the ex n 
define or the bleeding is fully bro 
2. "Badly injured or seriously 111 patten 
a it d quickly to intensive care 
wafting often for four to 12 hours i 
until arrangements are made to shu t 
coun hospital." 
los Angeles Coun instituted coun contro 
patient d ing s ortly thereafter. 
Despite these controls, over the period 
June 30, 1986, the los Angeles County Medical 
685 "problem trans r" reports. Of them, 3 % 
sent without ade ua stabilization; 37.5% 
acceptan e o the receiving hospital, and 5 
adequa e s lization and without accepta c 
It is impo tant to emphasize that patie t 
abnormal h pening to a very small u b 
patients sometimes tragic results. T 
cen emergen room patients whe 
n ige t reated with the highest deg 
hu an skill. Patient dumping is 
the me ni as it has been in 
however d s t at it happens in eve 
may well be urring with increasing freq 
The qu t h to do about it. 
I I I : E STATUTORY 
emergen care or a medica11 
reasons violates existing 
ning licensure of hospital emer 
rauma centers prohibit denia 
zardous transfers based on th 
laws authorize lifting the ho p 
gency room or removing its d i 
laws also provide for crimina 
persons who willfully violate t 
governing hospitals which a 
funds r c nstruction and federal laws gove ni 
receive reimbursement under Medicare and Medi-C 
denial of emergen care or medically haza d s 
based on a patient s inability to pay. This 1 
following sa ct ons: civil fines of up to $ 5 
and contrac 1 g emergency room doctors c 11 da 
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of Medicare nd Medi-Ca payments to hos i 
Califo nia~ he ral law would not app 
call" p s cia s. 
rgen oom guidelines of the Joint 
Accreditation of Hospitals (J.C.A.H.) and 
rgen Room P sicians (A.C.E.P.) set u 
and procedure emergen room operation 
emergen con t on must treated rega e 
p at ent's health must not be en 
t ans ear definitions of an emergen 
for tra s r are set forth. The trans rrin 
noti and sec re agreement from the receiving 
trans t must arrange for transportati 




particularly af c d 
asures protect their 
t dumping. los Angeles Co 
E.P. guidelines mandatory 
o her hospitals. Furthermo e 
c protocols and definition 
f r trans r. The p si 
are required to report •p 
e ines to the coun 's M 
ates the trans r and se 
assure that the trans rri 
violation. los Angeles 
contracted with the S 
te hospital licens 
gen dical Services 
The sanctions available 
recommendation to 1i 
cens or trauma cente 
isdemeanor complaint. W 
s b e to reduce its ~pro 
98 to just under 30 a 
ch s still unaccepta y 
as recently adopted co 
Angeles Coun rules 
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nancia1 reasons. San Die 
tight trauma care system 
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counties do not reimburse private hospitals and docto s because 
medically indigent pregnant women were not a part of t e M.I.A. 
transfer in 1982. Los Angeles county has initiated contracts 
with a number of private hospitals to handle the coun 
hospital's overflow of indigent patients seeking de11ve at a 
cost of about $5 million. Orange and San Diego count es only 
reimburse their respective University of California hospi ls 
which are the disproportionate providers of live me fcally 
indigent pregnant women. 
There is wide variation in the fee levels and manner of 
reimbursement of private·facilities for emergency trea nt and 
stabilization of M.I.A.s. Non contracting faciliti s in San 
Diego are reimbursed $275 a day while contracting hospi ls in 
San Bernardino are reimbursed at $800 a day for in nsive care 
unit days and $515 a day for routine hospital days San 
Bernardino and Riverside counties conduct utilization review of 
the "emergency" nature of the care provided through an outside 
agency; approximately 20% of private facilities' claims do not 
meet the counties' emergency criteria. San Bernardino and Los 
Angeles (until August 1986) capped their county payments r 
privately provided emergency care at 70% of the Medi-Cal payments 
to private facilities for emergency care to the M.I.A. 1 S in 1982. 
There is also wide variation in private physician's billings 
to the county for emergency care. In los Angeles~ those billings 
on an annual basis averaged less than $60,000 out of the $5 
million allocated for privately provided emergency care while in 
the much smaller counties of Contra Costa and San B rna 1no, 
annual physician billings were over three times as high. 
The 30 "contract back" counties are small counties of less 
than 300,000 population which have contracted with the state to 
operate and pay for MIA (but not other medically indigent 
services on a uniform basis. The state is at risk for a cost 
overruns. These counties represent less than 10% of the sta 1 S 
MIA population. Emergency care for M.I.A.'s by priva hospitals 
and doctors is reimbursed under traditional Medi-Ca po icies and 
rules. These counties and only a very few other of the 
independent counties reimburse for emergency care provi d 
outside the county borders to county residents. 
Because of these wide variations in county programs a coun 
mandate to pay for private emergency care at usua , c oma or 
reasonable charges would require either a large infusion of state 
or county funds or very large cuts in county outpatient programs. 
-94-
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APPENDIX 8: PROS AND CONS Of MANDATING COUNTY PAYMENTS FOR 
EMERGENCY CARE TO MEDICAllY INDIGENT ADULTS 
The following arguments are made by the C.M.A. in favor of 
mandating that counties pay for all privately provided emergency 
care to M.I.A.s: 
1. Counties receive $541 million from the state to pay for 
medical care to M.I.A.s. It is a county responsibility 
under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 17,000 to pay 
for health services to the medically indigent. It is 
wrong and unfair.that a minority of county governments 
can decide that private facilities and doctors should 
receive nothing for the emergency care they provide to 
M.I.A.s. 
2. County nonpayment policies cause great financial hardship 
to the disproportionate provider hospitals and the 
doctors who see the highest percentages of the medically 
indigent. 
3. Counties who currently pay for private sector emergency 
care will discontinue these payments if the state 
enforces its rules against patient dumping. 
4. The top priority of county health services should be 
paying for emergency care for the medically indigent. 
Outpatient care for the M.I.A.'s should, where necessary, 
be sacrificed to pay for emergency care. 
The following arguments are made against a county mandate by 
the California Association of Public Hospitals, the County 
Supervisors Association of California, and others: 
1. The MIA transfer was a block grant at 70% of funding. 
Since that time, the Governor has vetoed both annual 
C.O.L.A.'s as well as very large funds from the base, to 
the point where the program is even more severely under 
financed. 
2. The state courts have repeatedly held that counties are 
not obligated under Section 17,000 to pay for private 
sector emergency care to the medically indigent. To 
require them to do so is a state mandate. The 
Legislative Analyst estimated the cost of the C.M.A.•s 
proposed county mandate at $240 million. It is not 
possible to fund that amount out of county budgets 
because of Proposition 13 or out of the state budget 
because of Proposition 4. 
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PATIENT DUMPING PAPER 14 November 17, 1986 
Roughly half of all uncompensated care occurs in public 
hospitals (12% of the state's hospital beds) and roughly half in 
private hospitals. The public sector's half is financed 
primarily by state subventions (AB 8 and MIA funds) and county 
contributions. Public hospitals have only a small and decreasing 
percentage of privately insured patients. The private sector•s 
half is financed primarily through the "cost shift" {excess of 
charges over costs) from private insurance and Medicare. 
The public hospitals assert that with low rates paid through 
Medi-Cal selective contracting, and the underfunded M.I.A. 
transfer, they have lower revenues to pay for an uncompensated 
care burden which has been increasing both as a percentage of 
hospital revenues, and vis-a-vis the private sector. 
O.H~S~P:D's recent R!£Qrt~_fQ~etitiQrr confirms the public 
fac1l1t1es are experienCing substantTal financial difficulty in 
meeting their responsibilities. They are also unable to maintain 
and replace deteriorating buildings and equipment. 
The private hospitals complain that Medicare's D.R.G. 
reimbursement, the price discounts insisted upon by growing 
P.P.O.s and H.M.O.s, plus the MIA transfer and Medi-Cal selective 
contracting have eroded their capacity to provide uncompensated 
care. Recent reports by the federal Inspector General•s Office 
and O.S.H.P.D. 's Re£Ort_on_Co~etition indicate that private 
hospitals are making record prof1ts under Medicare D.R.G.s., are 
making healthy profits overall, are engaging in record capital 
spending, and have an essentially constant percentage of gross 
patient revenues devoted to uncompensated care. Despite this 
rosy picture, a small minority of private hospitals are probably 
experiencing financial distress comparable to public hospitals. 
A typical example may be Physicians and Surgeon's Hospital in San 
Diego which is located in a poor neighborhood and experiences 
twice as much uncompensated care as the county-wide average and 
over six times as much as some of the more favorably situated San 
Diego hospitals. 
The biggest uncompensated care problem rna be that under the 
banner of competition and deregulation, the urden of 
uncompensated care is being redistributed and is falling most 
heavily on a small number of public and private hospitals, and is 
not shared in equally by other hospitals and doctors. 
The essence of the dispute between the C.M.A. and the 
counties is over two very different approaches financing 
uncompensated care. C.M.A. has pushed for a coun mandate which 
would htlp all private sector providers in equal measures and use 
county or state dollars as the funding source - eg. SB 266 (B. 
Greene) and S.B. 1607 {Maddy). The counties have pushed for 
solutions which use state and federal funds help county health 
programs and all disproportionate providers - eg. AB 986 
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PATIENT DUMPING PAPER 15 November 17, 1986 
(Margolin}, AB 1159 (Bronzan) and 164 golin), and SB 636 
(Maddy). Thus, counties and t C.M.A di fer both over the 
funding source and who should receive the nds. A third 
approach was to restore the M.I.A.•s Medi-Cal - AB 12 
(Robinson). 
Over the past four years, the onl nding increases approved 
by the Governor to address these pro ems were in fiscal year 
1985-86: $15 million in disproportiona provi r funds for 
three University of California hospitals at Irvine, San Diego, 
and Davis, $5 million in disproportiona provider funds for all 
other hospitals, and a $50 million augmentation county health 
services to improve access to outpatient and inpatient care. The 
increased funds for the University of California hospitals and 
for county health services were cut in half in FY 1986-87 to $7.5 
million and $25 million respectively 
In light of the state spending cons n s under Proposition 
4, it is worth mentioning several off-budget solutions: 
A) AB 2004 (Bronzan) envisaged a hospital bed tax to 
increase funding for disproportionate provider hospitals. 
B) SB 1952 (Maddy) proposed a $1.00 f ne on a 1 moving 
traffic violations to raise $25 i11ion to p for 
uncompensated emergen care. 
C) AB 600 (McAlister) would have requ re nsurance pools to 
provide health insurance to persons with preexisting 
medical conditions at actuaria y e ermin d rates. This 
was vetoed by the Governor. 
D) AB 2990 (McAlister) would ha e requ red HMOs changing 
from nonprofit for profit s s to devote a portion 
of their increased ir market va ue accumula d under 
their nonprofit aegis uncomp sa d care for the 
medically indigent. 
E) AB 3132 (Bronzan) would have req re a Blue Ribbon study 
of uncompensated care and ac ess for the medically 
indigent. This was vetoed the Go ernor. 
A number of other sta s have vel d "re enue pooling" 
with contributions from all third pa s including 
Medicare, Medicaid, and priva insu ance n or r to 
redistribute funds to providers with a ea ercentages of bad 
debts and charity care. These sta s inc u assachusetts, New 
York, New Jersey, and Maryland. Each poo ing arrangement 
differs. Each of these sta s has all y ra setting unlike 
California where rate setting has been opposed the hospital 
industry. In Contra Costa Coun , a coalition o businesses, 
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DATE HOSPITAL FINANCIAL UNSTABLE CALLED ADMIT DX 
-------- --------- ---------- --------- ------- ------- -----------------
Sep 1 HOSP B PP y 0: OPEN TIB-FIB 
Sep 1 HOSP B M-CARE * y T: STAB, ABDO Sep 1 HOSP c PP y T: FX SI<ULL 
Sep 1 HOSP MT PP y FB; ESOPH 
Sep 1 HOSP N M-CAL RASH 
Sep 1 HOSP p pp T: MULT CONTUSION 
Sep 1 HOSP s pp y APAP O.D. 
Sep 1 HOSP M PP y T: C2 FX, RIB FX 
Sep 1 HOSP v MIA y 0: FX PATELLA 
Sep 2 HOSP c pp * y T: STAB; CHEST, A Sep 2 HOSP R PP y 0: COMPARTMENT SY 
Sep 2 HOSP sc PP * y T: STAB CHEST Sep 2 HOSP M M-CAL 0: FX TIB,FIB 
Sep 2 HOSP v MIA 0: BACK PAIN 
Sep 3 HOSP H PP N y T: TRAUMATIC PANC 
Sep 3 HOSP v MIA y PID 
Sep 4 HOSP K PP y COPD, TB 
Sep 4 HOSP N PP y ABDO PAIN 
Sep 4 HOSP 0 PP 0: FX RADIUS 
Sep 5 HOSP H pp ORBIT FX 
Sep 5 HOSP 0 so FACIAL ABRASION 
Sep 6 HOSP B PP T: FACIAL LAC 
Sep 6 HOSP c PP N 0: FX ELBOW 
Sep 6 HOSP 0 pp * y T: STAB CHEST <PN Sep 6 HOSP SA M-CAL N CHILD ABUSE 
Sep 6 HOSP SA M-CAL N y 0: TENDON LAC <PR 
Sep 7 HOSP B PP ? y T: C5 FX 
Sep 7 HOSP p PP y T: MULT TRAUMA 
Sep 8 HOSP BR so y T: GSW LEG 
Sep 8 HOSP s PP FB; FOOT 
Sep 8 HOSP SA MIA y SUBDURAL 
Sep 8 HOSP M KAISER T'FERED T: GSW FOOT 
Sep 8 HOSP v pp FACIAL LAC 
Sep 9 HOSP B PI 0: LAC FINGER 
Sep 9 HOSP v pp y 0: FX FEMUR 
Sep 10 HOSP B M-CAL y MULT. O.D. 
Sep 10 HOSP PS PP HEPITITIS 
Sep 11 HOSP B PP HEPITITIS 
Sep 11 HOSP B pp T: FACIAL LAC 
Sep 11 HOSP R MIA CHOLELITHIASIS 
Sep 12 HOSP SA MIA y 0: OPEN HUMEROUS 
Sep 12 HOSP M pp y T: GSW THIGH 
Sep 13 HOSP B PI y 0: FX FINGER <INF 
Sep 13 HOSP H pp y RENAL CA 
Sep 13 HOSP MT PP y ABDO PAIN 
Sep 13 HOSP R pp AMA T: PELLET NECK 
Sep 13 HOSP SA pp y 0: FX WRIST 
Sep 14 HOSP BR pp y 0: FX TIBIA 
Sep 14 HOSP H M-CAL y 0: FX TIB-FIB 
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14 HOSP H pp * 14 HOSP 0 M-CAL 
15 HOSP B PP 
15 HOSP BR MIA y 
15 HOSP I< PP 
15 HOSP LA PP 
15 HOSP ss PP 
15 HOSP RH PP * 15 HOSP R PP 
15 HOSP R PP 
15 HOSP R PF' 
15 HOSF' SA F'F' y 
15 HOSP M PP 
15 HOSP M PP y 
16 HOSP L PP y 
17 HOSP BR PP N 
17 HOSP R PP 
17 HOSP SA M-CAL * 18 HOSP s pp 
18 HOSP sc M-CAL 
20 HOSP M MIA 
20 HOSP M PP 
21 HOSP J-:" ··. PP 
21 HOSP LB PP 
21 HOSP p PP 
21 HOSP s so y 
21 HOSP SA M-CAL 
22 HOSP SA pp N 
22 HOSP v MIA 
l"')~ 
L·-' HOSP H PP 
23 HOSP 0 PP 
23 HOSP 0 M-CAL 
23 HOSP p PP ,.,.,. 
.;_...) HOSP s pp N 
23 HOSP sc PP y 
24 HOSP 0 M-CAL N 
24 HOSP SA MIA y 
25 HOSP DH MIA 
25 HOSP H PP y 
25 HOSP M pp y 
25 HOSP v M-CAL 
26 HOSP BR PP 
26 HOSP Q M-CAL 
26 HOSP v PP 
27 HOSP B pp 
27 HOSP L PP 
27 HOSP sc PP 
27 HOSP sc pp y 
27 HOSP M pp 
28 HOSP B so * 28 HOSP c pp 
28 HOSP H PP * <DIED> 28 HOSP 0 M-CAL 
28 HOSP 0 pp 
02-
Sep 28 HOSP sc PP y SIEZURE D/0 
Sep 29 HOSP 0 pp y 0: GSW ELBOW 
Sep 29 HOSP SA M-CAL y HERNIA, INCARCERA 
Sep 30 HOSP R pp y SEPSIS, ARF 
30 HOSP M MIA y RECTAL LAC <RAPE> 
Sep 30 HOSP v PP y R/0 APPI 
Oct 1 HOSP B pp T: FX RIBS 
Oct 1 HOSP c PP ETOH, SEIZURE 
Oct 1 HOSP K pp * y NEAR DROWNING Oct 1 HOSP R PP y 0: FX D/L THUMB 
Oct 1 HOSP s MIA y 0: TENDON HAND 
Oct 2 HOSP K MIA 0: AMP THUMB 
Oct 2 HOSP R M-CAL SEIZURE 
Oct 2 HOSP s M-CAL LWBS 0: SEPTIC JOINT 
Oct 3 HOSP PS MIA y BOWEL OBSTRUCTION 
Oct 3 HOSP I{ .. pp N 0: INFECTED HIP 
Oct 3 HOSP L PP T: CONCUSSION 
Oct -::-~· HOSP sc pp y 0: FX HUMERUS 
Oct 3 HOSP sc F'P T: CONCUSSION 
Oct 4 HOSP LB PF' N y 0: FX PATELLA 
Oct 4 HOSP s pp y PNEUMONIA 
Oct 5 HOSF' MT pp y T: CONCUSSION 
Oct 5 HOSP 0 F'P 0: FX FIBULA 
Oct 5 HOSP R PP y 0: FX TIB-FIB 
Oct 5 HOSP R pp y HEPATIC FAILURE 
Oct 5 HOSP v pp * y 0. D. , HYPOTENIVE Oct 6 HOSP MT M-CAL y 0: TENDON LAC 
Oct 6 HOSP 0 M-CAL 0: LAC HAND 
Oct 6 HOSP s pp y 0: FX TIB-FIB 
Oct 6 HOSP M PP y CVA 
Oct 6 HOSP M pp y 0: OPEN FX THUMB 
Oct 7 HOSP c PP y R/0 APPI 
Oct 7 HOSP LB pp N y 0: LAC HAND 
Oct 7 HOSP 0 pp INGINAL HERNIA 
Oct 8 HOSP H pp y 0: LAC LEG 
Oct 8 HOSP 0 PP y D. M. , ETOH 
Oct 8 HOSP SA M-CAL y 0: TENDON LACERAT 
Oct 9 HOSP B M-CARE T: MULT CONTUSION 
Oct 9 HOSP L pp T: HEAD TRAUMA 
Oct 9 HOSP M pp y 0: FX FEMUR 
Oct 10 HOSP p PP y PANCREATITIS 
Oct 11 HOSP H PP y PNEUMONIA 
Oct 11 HOSF' s pp y 0: TENDON LAC 
Oct 11 HOSP sc PP y HEROIN O.D. 
12 HOSP H PP * y T: FX PELVIS <MCA Oct 12 HOSP 0 pp y PANCREATITIS 
Oct 12 HOSP 0 F'P T: BEATING, O.D. 
Oct 12 HOSP sc pp y 0: FX TIB-FIB 
Oct 12 HOSP v PP CHEST PAIN 
Oct 1' -· HOSP H M-CAL URI 
Oct 1' ...... HOSP 0 pp FX MANDIBLE 
14 HOSP LB M-CARE N 0: FX CALCANEOUS 
Oct 14 HOSP MT MIA y R/0 APPI 
Oct 14 HOSP sc PP * y T: GSW ABDO 
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HOSP v pp ABDO I 
HOSP v PP COCA ABUSE 
HOSP cc pp ASTHMA 
HOSP 0 PP T: MULT CONTUSION 
HOSP DH PP 0: AMP DOLE FIN 
HOSP LA PP 0: FX LUMBAR VERT 
HOSP 0 PP y ARF 
HOSP v PP y SB OBSTRUCTION 
HOSP B pp AB 
HOSP MT PP T: MULT ABRASIONS 
HOSP B PP T: NEG EXAM 
HOSP DH pp N PHIMOSIS 
HOSP 0 PP * y CROUP HOSP M pp y 0: OPEN TOE 
HOSP B PP VAG BLEEDING 
19 HOSP M PP y 
20 HOSP c pp y AB 
20 HOSP MT PP CONTUS ON HEAD 
20 HOSP p PP T: LAC FACE 
20 HOSP p pp T: LAC FOREHEAD 
21 HOSP c PP * y 21 HOSP L PP * y T: GSW NECK 21 HOSP RC M-CARE N UTI 
21 HOSP sc PP N LAC 
21 HOSP v PP N 0: D/L FOOT 
22 HOSP c PI N 0: I<NEE STRAIN 
22 HOSP H M-CAL N HEADACHE 
22 HOSP H PP * y HEPATIC FAILURE, 22 HOSP H PP MIXED 0 D 
22 HOSP R pp DOG BITE 
HOSP SA M-CAL * y T: GSW HOSP B PP MIXED D 
HOSP BH PP N y ANGINA 
23 HOSP c PP N R/0 APPY 
HOSP DH M-CAL N HBP 
23 HOSP N pp N T'FERED I<ERAT I 
HOSP s pp PREGNANT PA 
23 HOSP sc pp N SCALP LAC 
24 HOSP B M-CAL N y 0: TENDON LAC THU 
24 HOSP BR pp N 0: FX MT 
24 HOSP L PP N ABDO PAI 
HOSP 0 PP y 0: AMP F NGERTIP 
24 HOSP R MIA y GSW THIGH 
HOSP sc pp N T: BAc•~: CONTUSION 
HOSP SA M-CAL 0: ANKLE INJURY 
25 HOSP H PP N 0: STRAIN 
HOSP s pp N 0: F 
25 HOSP sc MIA N EPISTAXIS 
26 HOSP B pp y 0: FX FEMUR 
26 HOSP B pp T: 
HOSP L PP y CVA 
HOSP L MIA AMA SEIZURE 
HOSP L pp y T: HEAD 
HOSP RA PP 0: F 
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Oct 27 HOSP R PP 0: STAB FORARM 
Oct 27 HOSP s PP y CELLULITIS FOOT 
Oct 27 HOSP sc M-CAL y 0: FX HAND <OPEN) 
Oct 27 HOSP v PP y RENAL CALCULI 
Oct 28 HOSP B pp N 0: FX FIBULA 
Oct 28 HOSP c pp N PROSTATITIS 
Oct 28 HOSP DH PP HEADACHE 
Oct 28 HOSP DH PP RENAL CALCULI 
Oct 28 HOSP LA PP N LWBS 0: BACI< INJURY 
Oct 28 HOSP L MIA N CHOLELITHIATHIS 
Oct 28 HOSP LB pp N y 0: I<NEE LAC <SEVE 
Oct 28 HOSP R PP N LWBS 0: BACt< INJURY 
Oct 28 HOSP R M-CAL N 0: FX FIBULA 
Oct 28 HOSP SA PP N EPISAXIS 
Oct 28 HOSP SA PP N 0: BACK INJURY 
Oct 28 HOSP SA M-CAL N 0: FX CLAVI CAL 
Oct 28 HOSP M pp N 0: FX .RADIUS 
Oct 28 HOSP v MIA y 0: FX/CELLULITIS 
Oct 29 HOSP DH ·PP GSW HEEL 
Oct 29 HOSP DH PP T: ABDO CONTUSSIO 
Oct 29 HOSP H pp N ANXIETY 
Oct 29 HOSP MT pp N 0: FX NAVICULAR 
Oct 29 HOSP 0 MIA 0: FX CLAVICLE 
Oct 29 HOSP s PP N 0: FX FIBULA 
Oct 29 HOSP s pp N 0: I<NEE LIG TEAR 
Oct 29 HOSP sc M-CARE N 0: CONTUSION LEG 
Oct 29 HOSP sc MIA N VAG BLEED 
Oct 30 HOSP MT pp N y 0: OPEN FX HAND 
Oct 30 HOSP 0 PP N INCOMPLETE AB 
Oct 30 HOSP sc PP N y UGI BLEED 
Oct 31 HOSP DH PP N 0: FX TIB-FIB 
Oct 31 HOSP MT M-CAL/CARE * y DM, CRF, DEHYDRAT 
Oct 31 HOSP MT M-CAL y 0: TENDON LAC THU 
Oct 31 HOSP 0 PP 0: LAC KNEE 
Oct 31 HOSP sc PP N CHEST WALL PAIN 
Oct 31 HOSP sc M-CAL N 0: FX ANI<LE 
Oct 31 HOSP M M-CAL 0: FX TIBIA 
Nov 1 HOSP B pp y T: HEAD TRAUMA 
Nov 1 HOSP c pp y SIEZURE D/0 
Nov 1 HOSP DH ? N MANDIBLE FX 
Nov 1 HOSP "( •. M-CARE & p y CHEST PAIN 
Nov 1 HOSP s pp y APPENDICITIS 
Nov 1 HOSP s pp N y LUNG MASS 
Nov 1 HOSP SA PP N BRONCHITIS 
Nov 1 HOSP SA PP 0: I<NEE LIG TEAR 
Nov 1 HOSP M pp 0: LAC HAND 
Nov 2 HOSP BR pp 0: FX WRIST 
Nov 2 HOSP H PP * y T: FX C-SPINE, RI Nov 2 HOSP MT M-CAL N y VAG BLEED 
Nov 2 HOSP 0 pp N MANDIBLE FX 
Nov 2 HOSP sc pp N PNEUMONIA 
Nov 3 HOSP B MIA y CELLULITIS 
Nov ..,.. HOSP B pp y PLEURAL, EFFUSION _, 
Nov 3 HOSP LB MIA N 0: FX HAND 
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3 HOSP MT F'P y APPEND I T S 
3 HOSP MT M-CAL y T: MULT TRAUMA 
3 HOSP v PP y 0: FEMUR FX 
4 HOSP A M-CAL N T: FX L-5 
4 HOSP A M-CAL N y T: FX PELVIS 
4 HOSP B PP y FX SCAPULA 
4 HOSP c PP N y OPEN FOOT 
4 HOSP H PP ITIS 
4 HOSP H PP * y FX T IB; PU 4 HOSP LB pp N 0: COLLE' FX 
4 HOSP LB PP N 0: FX PATELLA 
Nov 4 HOSP MT M-CAL 0: FX PATELLA 
4 HOSP p MIA N T S 
4 HOSP R PP FINGER 
4 HOSP v PP y s 
4 HOSP v MIA y 
5 HOSP B PP * y 0: ISCHE 5 HOSP B PP N 0: 
5 HOSP c PP N 0: STRAIN 
5 HOSP p PP N R/0 APPENDICITIS 
Nov 5 HOSP s pp y APPENDIC IS 
6 HOSP B M-CARE y SEPS S, DEHYDRATI 
Nov 6 HOSP SA pp y 0: ULNAR FX 
6 HOSP SA MIA y T: MULT FAC AL FX 
Nov 7 HOSP sc pp N LAC FINGER 
Nov 7 HOSP sc M-CAL N 0: LIG INJURY I<NE 
7 HOSP v pp y CVA 
7 HOSP v MIA 0: FX MC HAND 
7 HOSP v PP y 0: INF F'REPATELLA 
7 HOSP v MIA y RENAL CALCULI 
8 HOSP DH M-CAL N 0: F WRI 
8 HOSP MT PP ATYP CHEST PA 
8 HOSP 0 PP y IRON o. 
8 HOSP 0 PP 0: ? C-SP NE INJU 
8 HOSP p pp VAG BLEED 
8 HOSP R PP N OTITI 
8 HOSP SA pp y 0: T B-F B 
8 HOSP M M-CAL N 0: BACI< 
9 HOSP H MIA y 0: HAND INFECTION 
9 HOSP L MIA y T: MULT TRAUMA (Q 
9 HOSP s MIA PID, UTI 
9 HOSP sc pp y 0: TENDON LAC THU 
9 HOSP SA PP CHF 
9 HOSP SA M-CAL y FB ESOPHAGUS 
9 HOSP SA PP y PID 
9 HOSP SA PP N PNEUMON A 
0 HOSP I< PP y FACIAL 
11 HOSP BR PP y 0: LAC RAD AL ART 
11 HOSP DH PP N LAC FINGERS 
11 HOSP p PP N 0: F BULA 
11 HOSP sc PP N HEMATURI 
12 HOSP B PP N 0: FX F 
12 HOSP B PP y T: INTERCEREBRAL 
12 HOSP c pp N LAC ARM 
-106-
Nov 12 HOSP L pp N DIABETES 
Nov 12 HOSP R PP N 0: FX WRIST 
Nov 12 HOSP SA pp y 0: FX ULNA; CHILD 
Nov 12 HOSP v MIA y CHEST MASS 
Nov 13 HOSP H PP y R/0 APPENDICITIS 
Nov 13 HOSP p PP * y ECTOPIC Nov 13 HOSP R M-CAL N 0: FX RADIUS 
Nov 13 HOSP s pp N 0: FX ANKLE 
Nov 1-::' ._, HOSP sc M-CAL N LWBS HEMOPTYSIS 
Nov 13 HOSP SA pp N y INCOMPLETE AB 
Nov 14 HOSP K PP R/0 ECTOPIC 
Nov 14 HOSP s pp y 0: FX FEMUR 
Nov 14 HOSP SA PP y STATUS ASTHMATICU 
Nov 14 HOSP v PP N 0: FX ULNA 
Nov 15 HOSP c MIA 0: FX DISTAL RADI 
Nov 15 HOSP HT M-CAL N 0: R/0 FX LEG 
Nov 15 HOSP MT pp CONCUSSION 
Nov 15 HOSP 0 M-CAL N 0: ANKLE CONTUSIO 
Nov 15 HOSP SA M-CAL y 0: FX ELBOW 
Nov 15 HOSP M pp y 0: TENDON LAC HAN 
Nov 16 HOSP BR MIA LAC THUMB 
Nov 16 HOSP BR M-CAL T: MINOR HEAD TRA 
Nov 16 HOSP LB M-CARE FACIAL ABRASIONS 
Nov 16 HOSP R PP * y UNSTABLE ANGINA Nov 16 HOSP s pp T: MULT ABRASIONS 
Nov 16 HOSP sc M-CAL N FB VAGINA 
Nov 16 HOSP sc PP GASTROENTERITIS 
Nov 17 HOSP DH PP y GASTROENTERITIS 
Nov 17 HOSP f.( ' PP N T: GSW LEG 
Nov 17 HOSP MT pp 0: LAC/FX ANI<LE 
Nov 17 HOSP 0 pp 0: LAC HAND 
Nov 17 HOSP sc pp N ETOH LIVER DISEAS 
Nov 17 HOSP SA PP * y T: STAB ABDO Nov 17 HOSP SA PP * y T: STAB CHEST Nov 17 HOSP v pp y SEIZURE D/0 
Nov 18 HOSP B PP N 0: FX TIBIA 
Nov 18 HOSP 0 pp R/0 APPENDICITIS 
Nov 19 HOSP B pp ABDO PAIN 
Nov 19 HOSP c PP y TYLENOL O.D. 
Nov 19 HOSP L PP HTN 
Nov 19 HOSP sc MIA HEADACHE 
Nov 19 HOSP SA M-CAL N 0: FX HAND 
Nov 20 HOSP B MIA y 0: FX TIBIA & ELB 
Nov 20 HOSP H M-CAL y ENDOMETRIOSIS 
Nov 20 HOSP L MIA SEIZURE D/0 
Nov 20 HOSP 0 M-CAL N 0: FX HAND 
Nov 20 HOSP R PP 0: TENDON LAC HAN 
Nov 20 HOSP s PP N 0: FX FINGER 
Nov 20 HOSP sc PP N 0: GSW GREAT TOE 
Nov 2(> HOSP SA MIA y PNEUMONIA 
Nov 20 HOSP v pp y T: MULT RIB FX 
Nov 21 HOSP B pp TYLENOL O.D. 
Nov 21 HOSP DH M-CAL N 0: FX RADIUS 
Nov 21 HOSP DH M-CAL N 0: FX RADIUS 
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Nov 21 HOSP sc pp * y CHF, SEVERE Nov 21 HOSP SA pp * y T: STAB ABDO Nov 21 HOSP M PP N INCOMPLETE AB 
Nov 22 HOSP DH MIA RENAL CALCULI 
Nov 22 HOSP 0 M-CAL 0: FX FINGER 
Nov 22 HOSP 0 MIA N SCROTAL ABSCESS 
Nov 22 HOSP p pp N 0: FX FINGER 
Nov 22 HOSP R MIA y 0: LAC HAND 
Nov 22 HOSP sc pp N LAC EAR 
Nov 23 HOSP DH pp N LWBS 0: FX WRIST 
Nov 23 HOSP H MIA N 0: FX ANKLE 
Nov 23 HOSP K PP T: STAB FLANK 
Nov 23 HOSP 0 PP * y T: SUBQ EMPHYESEM Nov 23 HOSP s pp D. D. 
Nov 23 HOSP sc pp N 0: BACK PAIN 
Nov 24 HOSP 0 PP N HEPITIT s 
Nov 24 HOSP p M-CAL N 0: FX FOOT 
Nov 24 HOSP R pp y ASA O.D 
Nov 24 HOSP SA PP y R/0 APPENDICITIS 
Nov 25 HOSP L PP N R/0 ECTOPIC 
Nov 25 HOSP 0 pp y 0: FX TIB-FIB 
Nov 25 HOSP sc M-CAL N CIRRHOSIS 
Nov 25 HOSP sc pp N CORROSIVE TO ARM 
Nov 25 HOSP M pp N y MASTOID INF 
Nov 25 HOSP M MIA N 0: FX METATARSAL 
Nov 26 HOSP B PP * y T: CHEST TRAUMA Nov 26 HOSP R pp N NOSE LAC 
Nov 26 HOSP sc PP y PANCREATITIS 
Nov 27 HOSP 0 pp N 0: FX METACARPALS 
Nov 27 HOSP 0 M-CARE PLEURAL EFFUSION 
Nov 27 HOSP sc PP N 0: FX WRIST 
Nov 27 HOSP sc PP N URI 
Nov 27 HOSP SA M-CAL N 0: FX WRIST 
Nov 27 HOSP v M-CARE T: MULT LAC, PERI 
Nov 28 HOSP H pp y 0: FX ACETABULUM 
Nov 28 HOSP H PP y T: MULT TRAUMA 
Nov 28 HOSP s M-CAL y 0: FX ACETABULUM 
Nov 28 HOSP SA M-CAL N 0: FX TIBIA 
Nov 28 HOSP SA PP N PID 
Nov 29 HOSP c pp 0: FX TIB-FIB 
Nov 29 HOSP s PP PUD 
Nov 29 HOSP v pp y 0: FX ACETABULUM 
Nov 30 HOSP B pp y 0: FX,D/L ARM 
Nov 30 HOSP 0 pp y CHF 
Nov 30 HOSP 0 PP N 0: FX RADIUS 
Nov 30 HOSP R pp N 0: KNEE STRAIN 
Nov 30 HOSP SA pp 0: FX CALCANEOUS 
Nov 30 HOSP SA M-CAL N 0: FX FEMUR 
Nov 30 HOSP v M-CAL y PYLORIC, STENOSIS 




STABILITY FOR TRANSFER 
Max Lebow, M.D. 
Clinical Director, Emergency Services 
San Bernardino County Medical Center 
Before a patient may be transferred to San Bernardino County 
Medical Center, the sending hospital must provide such evaluation 
as required by the patient's condition to determine that the 
patient is medically stable for transfer. 
In the past, the definition of "stable for transfer" has 
varied widely from patient to patient and hospital to hospital. 
San Bernardino County Medical Center will use the guidelines 
discussed below to determine stability for transfer. San 
Bernardino County Medical Center will not accept an unstable 
patient in transfer, regardless of the patient's financial 
condition. Specific exceptions include patients who require 
specialized treatment in San Bernardino County Medical Center's 
Burn Unit or Neonatal ICU. 
Both the California Administrative Code (Title 22, 
Sec. 51110), and the Manual of Criteria for Medi-Cal 
Authorization (Ch. 4.6) define "medically stable for transfer" as 
the condition of an acute care patient which allows the patient 
to reasonably sustain a transport in an EMT-I staffed ambulance 
with no expected increase in morbidity or mortality. (An EMT-I 
may not transport a patient who requires intravenous medication 
or an intravenous line to which medication has been added. They 
may only monitor and turn off the flow of intravenous fluids.) 
While most intrahospital patient transfers to San Bernardino 
County Medical Center are by higher level of ambulance personnel, 
San Bernardino County Medical Center will only accept patients 
who are able to be transported by EMT-1 safely. These patients 
must have a stable blood pressure and pulse, and must be 
breathing without assistance. 
The following patients will be considered unstable for 
transfer to San Bernardino County Medical Center. This list is 
not meant to be all-inclusive, and patients with conditions not 
listed may be unstable under certain circumstances. 
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Patients whose vital signs or stability are 
immediately dependent upon drug therapy 
- Patients who are intubated 
- Patients requiring continuous cardiac monitoring 
and/or the potential for cardiac resusitation 
- Shock (systolic BP <100 with clinical signs of shock) 
- Acute Respiratory Insufficiency (P02 <60, resp acidosis, 
resp distress) 
- Severe metabolic abnormalities (DKA, severe acidosis, 
severe hyponatremia) 
- Myocardial Infarction, R/0 Myocardial Infarction, Unstable 
Angina 
- Unstable cardiac arrhythmias 
- Severe Hypertension (BP >200/130) 
- Severe anemia or active internal bleeding 
- Life threatening infections (meningitis, sepsis, 
complicated infections in compromised hosts) 
- Imminent Labor 
- Fetal Distress 
- Ectopic Pregnancy 
- Active third trimester bleeding 
- Status epilepticus 
- Focal Neurologic Deficits caused by Trauma 
- Unstable Spinal Fractures 
- Penetrating Chest Wounds 
- Penetrating Abdominal Wounds 
- Cardiac Contusion 
- Flail Chest 
- Severe Vascular Injury 
- Ischemic limb 
- Near Drowning 
- Patients less than 24 hours post-surgery 
- Acute altered level of consciousness 
San Bernardino County Medical Center recognizes that there 
are times when stabilization is not possible because a hospital 
does not have the appropriate personnel or equipment needed to 
correct the underlying disease process. In these cases, an 
adequate airway, control of hemorrhage, and initiation of fluid 
and/or blood replacement should be preformed and the transfer 
should be carried out as quickly as possible to the closest 
facility able to deliver the appropriate care. 
Federal Social Security Act, Section 1867 
California Adminstrative Code; Title 22, Sec. 51110, 70451, 1317 
Joint Commission on Accreditation Manual, 1985; p.l8 
Manual of Criteria for Medi-Cal Authorization, Chapter 4.6 
California Hospital Association, Consent Manual (12th ed.), 
Chapter 14, Sec. 14.2, 14.6 
American College of Emergency Physicians; Policy Statement on 
Transfer of Patients, Aug. 13, 1985 
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• 
October 17, 1986 
TO: Joseph K. Indenbaum 
FROM: Truman Chaffin 
SUBJECT: PROBLEM TRANSFER REPORTS 
Attached is a summary of Problem Transfer Reports received from 
four County Hospitals for the period July 1, 1984 through June _ 
30, 1986. 
Of 645 Problem Transfer Reports received 
- 31% were sent without adequate stabilization 
- 37 1/2% were sent without acceptanc~ 
- 15% were sent without adequate stabilization and without 
acceptance. 






PROBLEM TRANSFER REPORTS 
JULY 1, 1984-JUNE 30, 1986 
HARBOR LACLUSC M.L.K. OLIVE 
UCLA VIEW -
July 84 3 6 1 0 
August 1 29 0 3 
I 
September 4 29 1 0 
October 3 21 0 4 
November 0 19 0 1 
December 4 77 0 3 
January 85 6 33 0 1 
February 3 13 1 0 
March 2 26 0 4 
April 1 0 2 g. 
May 2 0 2 1 
June 0 37 4 0 
Total 29 290 11 26 
July 85 3 24 0 0 
August 5 29 0 0 
September 3 26 2 1 
October 0 14 0 0 
November 2 18 0 1 
December 2 10 0 1 
January 86 3 20 0 0 
February 3 28 0 1 
March 2 12 0 3 
April 3 9 0 2 
May 0 36 0 0 
June 3 23 0 0 
Total 29 249 2 9 -
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Chiefs of Staff, Los 
Arthur N. Lurvev, M.D., 
Medically Indigent Adult 
Hospitals 
, LAC!1A- P.MS S 
The Los Angeles County Medically t Adult (MIA) Program pro-
vides a system of reimbursement to te physicians for health 
care services rendered to County-responsible emergency patients. 
These are patients who are categorical unable to ~ay for services 
and do not fit into existing public/private insurance/reimbursement 
programs. PRIVATE PHYSICIANS WHO HAVE RE~~ERED MEDICAL CARE TO PRO-
GRAM ELIGIBLE PATIENTS AT COUNTY-CONTRACTED PRIVATE HOSPITALS ARE 
ABLE TO BILL THE COUNTY FOR THEIR SERVICES. 
However, physician participation 
at best. The figures below represent 
under the MIA program for the per 
30, 1985 according to County records. 
been paid County-wide to all partie 
, period. Whether this is due to a 
gram, difficulties experienced ta 
from participating hospitals or simpl 
tape and reduced reimbursement rates 
s program has been sporadic 
billings by your hospital 
e 1, 1985 through December 
By contrast, only $19,000 has 
ting physicians for the same 
of familiarity with the pro-
authorization information 
senchantment with the red 
d is unclear. 
Number of 
Patients Hospital 
Antelope Valley Hosp $139,988.47 248 
Questions concerning the elig ili 
has been rendered should directe to 
Other questions concerning this program 
at LACMA headquarters. 
tients whom treatment 
hospital billing office. 
may be directed to Bob Holt 
This letter should not be construed 
offered by the Department of Heal 
tion to provide the individual phys 
to make an informed decision. There 
as an endorsement of the contracts 




. . . l .~ ,": J~-
• -:1' t ·, ' '"" ,' ' / /. ' __;· //"'" '-- C~.- \...I ~u. _ ) / ._ 'LC'L-" '-'/) 
Arthur N. Lurvey, M.D. ~­
Chairman, LACMA-HMSS 
cc: HMSS Representatives 
Directors Emergency Services 
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ces. It is simply our inten-
with the information required 
, your assistance in dissemi-













Mr. Murphy was Injured tn an ultralight alrcran accident 
suffered a severfy commtnuted talar fracture and fractured humerus. 
Treatment was delayed because of econom triage transfer Saint Agnes 
Hospital. He arrived at Valley Medical later wi severe 
fracture blisters and detertorated sl<tn conditions preventing surgery. The 
skin condition posed too great a rtsk of infection for surgery at that time. 
The patient Is now with permanent partial residual Impairment, secondary to 
post-tramatlc degenerative arthritis In the a or weight bearing 
joint. Delay of early treatment contri 






Mr. Villareal suffered a severed 
proximal tlbla with a rupture of the popH 
blood to the lower leg and root). He was r seen at Hanford 
Hospital where treatment was delayed approximately 11 
reasons before he was transferred to Val Center. 
t 
Valley Medical center was too late to prevent muscle and nerve necrosts 
below the knee, (death due to lack a I 
1nsensttlve, and Immobile foot and ank 
could have predisposed the patient to at high risk 
the 11mb, secondary to Infection, and the pat f 11 remains at 
amputation because of the stiff dysesthetic foot whi to 
areas of pressure, which can lead to breakdown of 





Ml CHELLE FLAHIVE 
18 Years 
(209) 298-5277 
Ms. Flahive was in a motor vehicle accident in Yosemite Pari< and 
was brought by hellcopter to Saint Agnes Hospital and transferred to Valley 
Medical Center two and one-half (2 1/2) days later with no specific 
treatment for a poster\or fracture dislocation of the hip. This delay in 
reduction of the hip can be contributory in a significant manner to 
degenerative arthritis of the hip, secondary to avascular necrosis, and this 
condition is a serious residual permanent partial impairment and essentially 
has a crippling potent1 . The only reconstructive option for arthritis of the 
hip is fusion, a sign1ficant permanent functional impairment for a person of 




On May 13, 1986, Mr. Zarate was involved in a car accident near Lodi, 
and was taken to Lodi tal with injuries of a·left femur fracture and 1eft 
tenth rib fracture. For unknown reasons the patient was subsequently 
transferred, after I 0 to i 2 to Valley Medical Center where the patient 
developed shoe!< lung, adult respiratory distress syndrome, and eventually, 
approximately one month later in the intensive care unit. succumbed to this 
complication of femur The chances of this event being minimized by 
early treatment of the femur fracture is well documented. Specifically, 
Johnson, et aJ. Journal of Iruama. Apri\ 1985. The morbidity and mortality of 
patients with femur fracture who receive treatment early within the first 24 
hours to stablized the long bone had 1/5 morbidity and mortality of an equal 
group with a comparable injury severity score. Therefore, it could be said 
that delay in his treatment for what may presumably be purposes of economic 
triage significantly his risk for eventual mortality here. 
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CASE In_5: Patient: 
Age: 
Telephone: 
This patlent approximately one ye , le playing with 
brother had a hyper-extension injury resulted a 
proximal tibia fracture and a popliteal artery injury main artery the leg 
supplying blood to the lower leg and foot>. The patient was t1ally seen at 
Valley Children's Hospital but because there could be no response a 
Medi-Cal patient at Valley Children's Hospltal, the patient was transferred to 
Valley Medical Center. At Valley Medical Center there were several 
emergencies going on at that time which the access to the 
operating room which would have been appropri a w1 an 
artery injury associated with a fracture. By the time the patient came to the 
operating room, which was ~ours after admi on at Valley Medical Center, 
he showed signs of permanent muscle and nerve below the knee. This 
put him immediately at risk for amputation, and for 
the same criteria mentioned in the case of i l Js remains at 
risk for a later amputation due to lack of f ility 
in the foot. This state of affairs and permanent a1 residual impairment 
is most probably a direct result of delay in treatment secondary to 
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